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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MENTORING PERCEPTIONS IN THE MILITARY

BY

MS. MERRILL ANDERSON-ASHCRAFT Department of the Navy

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USAWC CLASS OF 2002



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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MENTORING PERCEPTIONS IN THE MILITARY

by

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ABSTRACT

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Currently, military organizations report that junior officers are expressing some dissatisfaction with formally developed mentoring relationships. In some agencies, senior officers are tasked with the responsibility for implementing mentoring relationships. This paper analyzes military mentoring programs using input from senior military officers who are attending U. S. Army War College (U.S. AWC), Class of 2002. The analysis attempts to discover the underlying problems that may be leading to ineffective mentoring relationships. The concepts of organizational diagnosis are the foundation of this analysis. Porras' (1987) stream analysis method was used as a tool to identify and categorize problems. A second in-depth analysis was conducted by reviewing 64 papers written on the topic of Army Mentorship. At the request of COL Gregg Martin (US AWC Professor), the student body voluntarily submitted these essays for review. (The mentoring topic was chosen by the US AWC to test the writing skills of its American student body.) The paper will attempt to distinguish between symptoms and root causes and provides nine recommendations with implementation strategies for improvements.

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MENTORING PERCEPTIONS IN THE MILITARY

This paper investigates perceptions of effectiveness of United States (US) military mentoring among the American student body of the U. S. Army War College (US AWC), Class of 2002. The military, like other organizations outside of the Department of Defense (DoD), have adopted the concept of mentoring as a useful means to enhance the development of future leaders. Steven Hays of the University of Southern California states the primary reason for the growing interest in mentoring over the last few decades is due to the influx of women and minorities into management positions. Workforce diversity enhances organizations' ability to overcome obstacles by introducing alternative views and innovations, which are critical to the success of the organization in today's society. In essence, the organization must strive to create a learning environment. In Managers as Mentors, Chip Bell presents the current era of businesses, undergoing revolutionary changes, where success is often measured on an organization's abilities to adapt and to innovate.² This demands high levels of knowledge at lower levels in the organization. Almost all employees in the future will need technological skills. The military is no different. As knowledge is driven down into the organization, employees who once looked upon superiors (supervisors) to solve problems are empowered to be their own problem solvers. The role of superiors (leaders) as sole decision-makers in this new information era has also changed. Bell states, "the old model of a leader as authority and corporate parent has been and is being altered to one of leader and supporter, enabler, and even partner." Bell believes mentoring will play a vital role in the interpersonal encounters amongst subordinates and their leaders. Mentoring achieves success in leader development through the development of non-threatening, long-term relationships forged by mutual respect and a genuine desire to grow as an individual and professionally.

Others have also belittled mentoring as a useful tool in leader development. Gary Yukl, author of *Leadership in Organizations*, lists five studies that show mentoring has had a positive affect on career advancement into leadership roles. The military has also published numerous articles on the positive aspects of mentoring. For example, the Navy conducted a "Mentoring Experience Survey" of which 691 recipients (retired Admirals who had left active duty by 1996) responded. A majority of the respondents (67%) were mentored during their careers and had benefited from the relationship in four areas: (a) benefiting from mentor's advice, (b) having been recommended for important assignments, (c) mentor expressing confidence in protégé's leadership ability, and (d) observing the mentor's actions. In February 1999, Air Force Major General William T. Hobbins, director of US Air Forces Europe, suggested that mentoring would

help retention of pilots and enlisted technicians. In mid 1999, Army Major General Lon E. Maggart, Retired, and Colonel Jeanette S. James discussed mentoring as a more personal approach to training and a critical element in leader development. However, based on the data collected during this study, military mentoring has not been perceived as an entirely successful leadership development program. Many agencies are still striving to work out implementation programs that will be perceived by its members as valuable, equitable and fair. The Army, like other government organizations tasked with implementing mentoring programs, faces many more constraints than private industry. Some of these constraints include: (a) members frequently rotating in and out of positions making it difficult to maintain long-term relationships; (b) increasing operating tempos while decreasing manpower, limiting time available to both mentor and protégé; (c) developing programs that are both fair and equitable to all its members; and (d) availability of limited resources constraining the use of developmental tools such as training and educational programs. These constraints push the military to deviate from the classical connotation of mentoring. The classical definition of mentoring, derived from Homer's Odyssey, singles out a unique life-long relationship between two mutually agreed parties, to the benefit of both the protégé and the mentor. 8 There is no expectation in the classical model of allinclusive relationships between the mentor and all his followers. The relationship is an exclusive one between an individual who is being groomed for leadership and his mentor. This departure from the classical definition can be found in Army Leadership: Be Know, Do, (FM 22-100) doctrine that defines mentoring as follows:

Mentoring (in the Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under the leader's charge. 9

This doctrine specifically singles out the senior leader's responsibilities to mentor subordinates without specifying the roles and responsibilities of junior officers:

The commitment to mentoring future leaders may require you to take risks. It requires you to give subordinates the opportunity to learn and develop themselves while using your experience to guide them without micromanaging.... As you assume positions of greater responsibility, as the number of people for whom you are responsible increases, you need to do even more to develop your subordinates. More in this case, means establishing a leader development program for your organization. It also means encouraging your subordinates to take actions to develop themselves personally and professionally. In addition, you may have to provide time for them to pursue self-development. ¹⁰

These statements have resulted in senior officers feeling a sometimes overwhelming responsibility to mentor all subordinates in an equitable manner. There is little mention in Army Leadership: Be Know, Do. (FM 22-100) doctrine of the characteristics, skills or abilities needed by individuals to be successful at mentoring. Also, without depicting expected outcomes from successful mentoring or demonstrating the governing experience and training necessary for effective mentoring, the military agencies create false expectations on the part of both the mentor and the protégé. Directing human relationships in doctrine is an extremely difficult task. Chemistry between two individuals cannot be forced on the basis of doctrine. Chemistry (rapport) occurs only naturally through a course of events that have commonalties. However, the problems are multiplied by declaring the program as an inclusive program that promises fairness and equity for all its members. Classical mentoring is neither all-inclusive nor equitable. In the past only those showing promise and willingness caught the eye of the superior and earned the privilege of being mentored, if they so desired. Some people choose not to be mentored and can be equally successful as those who are mentored. There is too much focus today on leaders who were mentored and not enough on those who were not mentored but became successful.

Mentoring is currently viewed as a method that helps propel careers. In outside industry mentoring is part of accession planning. Leader development affects the organization's success and has an impact in the environment in which it operates. To evaluate current senior leaders' perceptions of the weaknesses inherent in the military's implementation of mentoring, an organizational diagnosis was performed as a tool to expose the underlying issues. The organizational diagnosis conducted applies open system theory and uses Porras' "Stream Analysis" model as a foundation for interpretation. The open system theory was selected because it clearly demonstrates the significance of the relationship among the organization, the environment, and the people.

BACKGROUND

Mentoring was chosen as a special theme for the US AWC, Class of 2002. The topic of mentoring was discussed in each seminar class, as well as, used as a topic to collect writing samples from students during the first few weeks of classes. During class discussions on mentoring, complexity of the issues became apparent. The data collected for this study was acquired from students in the US AWC, Class of 2002. Voluntary participants either participated in a stream analysis intervention or donated their writing samples on the topic. Although each

service implements their own mentoring program, the Army leadership model was used as a foundation for military mentoring programs.¹²

OPEN SYSTEMS THEORY

The open systems theory can best be described using a metaphor developed by Gareth Morgan of "Organizations as Organisms." ¹³ Metaphors are easier to envision as they draw comparisons to aspects that are more familiar to an individual. An individual can develop a mental model of the needs of an organism for survival. The individual can draw upon the analogy between needs of organisms and the needs of organizations like the Department of Defense (DoD) in similar terms. The importance of development of mental models is best described by Peter Senge as: "Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take actions." ¹⁴ The environment plays an important role in the survival of an organism and likewise plays an equally important role in the survival of an organization. In order for an organism or an organization to thrive, it must be in a supportive environment. If the internal or external environment is not supportive, the organization will struggle to survive.

Refer to figure 1, as the typical "Open Systems Framework" model used by businesses to depict organizations as drawn by Harrison and Shirom. ¹⁵ In business the terms *inputs*, *methods* and *outputs* can be related to the military terms: *means*, *ways*, and *ends*. For the military inputs are "means", methods are "ways," and outputs are "ends." Although the military's external clients are ultimately the American people, it is the internal environment in which the military operates that the organization exercises its greatest influence. Their internal clients are professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen who must rely on each other to survive volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous situations that the military faces today.

Critical thinking develops over time with exposure to complex problems. From the ability to think critically grows the ability to think strategically. Learning develops as a result of experience. But experience can be gained in many different ways. According to David Kolb experience can be gained experientially either by: (a) concrete experience (actually have learned to do the task), (b) reflective observation (evaluating actions of others), (c) abstract conceptualization (building mental models), or (d) active experimentation (testing alternative ways of doing tasks). Observing, conceptualizing and experimenting can be seen as components of effective mentoring strategies. Therefore, mentoring junior officers plays an

important role in developing future leaders who are capable not only of critical thinking but also strategic thinking.




FIGURE 1. OPEN SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

The mentor becomes a role model to emulate, a confidant to share thoughts and ideas, and more importantly someone who guides and provides alternatives for the protégé to consider. Many people believe mentors are sages, wise old advice givers who know the formula for success. The author believes the true essence of mentoring is to offer guidance, not advice. A mentor should have sufficient knowledge to present alternative views of issues and to allow the protégé to choose their own path, even when the choice may result in setbacks. Future leaders must be able to evaluate issues on their own and are needed to apply critical and strategic thinking to worldwide problems to assure the protection of America's vital interests.

The organism must receive nourishment from its environment; for the military, nourishment comes in the form of means (resources such as money, manpower, machines and materials). Figure 2 depicts Department Of Defense As An Open System, and is a model derived from figure 1. Leadership development is one method of ensuring future military leaders. Management plays a key role in creating an environment conducive to growing leaders. The military's management structure is hierarchical. The goal for leadership development is for management to reinforce desired behaviors that result in leaders with strategic vision to ensure security of our nation and its people. Management creates the internal environment in which

people are encouraged or discouraged. However, management alone cannot determine an individual's behavior; the individual controls his or her own behaviors. ¹⁷ Depending on management style, an individual's behavior can be either positively or negatively reinforced. Mentoring is a way of encouraging an individual's positive behaviors while discouraging his or her negative behaviors. The internal environment is one element for which the organization has responsibility and some degree of control. The military's end state for mentoring is to have effective leaders. Is the military internal environment nurturing? Does it encourage the development of its future leaders? Is the organization a place of learning and growth?




FIGURE 2. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS AN OPEN SYSTEM

As shown in Figure 2, the Department Of Defense As An Open System, the internal environment is affected by its culture. In *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, the essence of military culture is described as "an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared ethos." In one of the findings entitled "strong, effective leadership" the report stated:

Strong leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for the operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however,

are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders....The single most influential factor in determining morale, cohesion, and organizational climates is the quality of local leadership....The services have yet to master an optimal system for consistently identifying, promoting, and developing their <u>best</u> [emphasis mine] leaders. Leader selection and development systems are at the heart of the matter, and both are intentionally tied to the underlying military culture. ¹⁹

STREAM ANALYSIS MODEL

Jerry Porras developed a powerful method for organizational diagnosis referred to as "Stream Analysis." Organizational diagnosis encompasses many methodologies; stream analysis is one method for determining the nature of underlying problems (whether or not those problems are real or perceived). Stream analysis develops its foundations from open systems theory. Porras refers to the model as a "procedural and implementation theory that is represented graphically." Stream analysis outlines steps to use in planning a change process intervention. The visual nature of the graphical product enables understanding at all levels in the organization. The strength of this model is not only its ability to reveal underlying root causes and their resulting symptoms but also its ability to be used to plan and track progress of organizational change visually.

Porras' application of the open systems theory to stream analysis builds upon the foundation of the individual's job performance contribution to the organization's effectiveness and the organization's responsibility to the individual's development. In "Soldiers and Warriors, Warriors and Soldiers" retired General Richard G. Trefry states: "The ability to accept and inspire others to change...is perhaps the true essence of the successful soldier....You must be a great teacher if you are to be a great soldier." Many organizations have viewed mentoring as a means of effectively growing leaders.

The effectiveness of this relationship between the organization and the individual can be predicted using expectancy theory. Expectancy theory assists in understanding a mechanism of motivation for changing individuals' behaviors. Expectancy theory is a process model that focuses its emphasis on the affects of the environment that contributes to worker satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The key feature of this theory is individuals are motivated to perform work when they have a reasonable expectation that: (a) they have the ability to achieve the outcome (efficacy expectation=EE), (b) the effort to achieve the outcome is considered worthwhile (outcome expectation=OE), and (c) the outcome will result in a reward that they personally value (valence=V).




FIGURE 3. PORRAS' STREAM ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

As shown in Figure 3, Porras' Stream Organizational Model depicts the open system theory in which individuals and their organizational relationships are at the core of the stream analysis model. The stream analysis technique focuses its efforts on the organization's internal environment, rather than the external environment over which the organization may have little control. According to Porras, the work settings have an impact on the behaviors of individuals by sending signals that affect the member's expectations. Referring to figure 3, these work settings can be organized into components in four dimensions: (a) organizing arrangements, (b) social factors, (c) technology, and (d) physical settings. Refer to table 1.

Organizing Arrangements	Social Factors	Technology Factors	Physical Settings
A. Goals (OA1)	A. Culture (SF1) 1. Basic Assumptions 2. Values 3. Norms 4. Language and Jargon 5. Rituals 6. History 7. Stories 8. Myths 9. Symbols	A. Tools, Equipment, and Machinery (TF1)	A. Space Configuration (PS1) 1. Size 2. Shape 3. Relative Locations
B. Strategies (OA2)	B. Interaction Processes (SF2) 1. Interpersonal 2. Group 3. Inter-group	B. Technical Expertise (TF2)	B. Physical Ambiance (PS2) 1. Light 2. Heat 3. Noise 4. Air Quality 5. Cleanliness
C. Formal Structure (OA3)	C. Social Patterns and Networks (SF3) 1. Communication 2. Problem Solving/ Decision Making 3. Influence 4. Status	C. Job Design (TF3)	C. Interior Design (PS3) 1. Decorations 2. Furniture 3. Window Coverings 4. Floor Coverings 5. Colors a. Floors b. Walls c. Ceilings
D. Administrative Policies and Procedures (OA4)	D. Individual Attributes (SF4) 1. Attitudes and Beliefs 2. Behavioral Skills 3. Feelings	D. Work Flow Design (TF4)	D. Architectural Design (PS4)
E. Administrative Systems (OA5)		E. Technical Policies and Procedures (TF5)	
F. Formal Reward Systems (OA6) 1. Evaluation System 2. Pay Systems 3. Benefits Packages		F. Technical Systems (TF6)	

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS IN STREAM ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

The organizing arrangements can be thought of as the *formal* organization (how operations are supposed to work). The social factors can be viewed as the *informal* organization (how operations really work). The technology factor can be viewed as anything used to *transform* (ways or methods) *means* (resources such as manpower, machines and materials) to ends (outputs valued by the organization or its clients, in this case the American people). The final aspect is physical settings. The physical settings include objects and arrangements as well as structures. (Table 1, "Description Of Organizational Components In Stream Organizational Model," is a depiction of these work settings by G. E. Germaine. ²⁶ In table 1, codes have been assigned to the various categories. For example the first item, Goals, under Organizing Arrangement's category is given the code *OA1*. These codes are used to simplify the subcategorical items used in this paper.)

In the stream analysis process, problems (or issues) are identified by participants and placed into one of the four dimensional areas. After categorizing the problems participants are asked to evaluate the existence of relationships between the problems. Problems that drive other problems are revealed in this analysis as arrows are drawn from the originating problem and point to another problem. Problems that are shown to drive many other problems are referred to as "core problems." While problems that do not drive many other problems but are the result of being driven by other problems in the analysis are referred to as "symptoms." Symptoms are usually the most *visible* problems, while core problems are usually *hidden*. Management often attempts to cure symptomatic problems without fixing the underlying core problem. These quick fixes are usually ineffective and can result in declining morale, as the real root of the problem is left to fester.

Another class of problems that are deeper rooted and are also the least visible are referred to by Porras as "fundamental problems." Fundamental and core problems, when fixed, can usually cure a multitude of symptoms. However, fundamental problems and core problems are usually the hardest to find and the most difficult to fix. Often these fundamental or core problems are caused by an environmental factor over which the organization may have little control and therefore remain unfixable (such as availability of resources, Congressional or other legislative mandates). These are in part responsible for the DoD's mentoring implementation dilemmas. Congressional mandates have: (a) downsized the manpower, (b) outsourced its organizational infrastructure, and (c) increased the demands of personnel tempo. At the same time, the funding has not kept pace with operating tempo, as the military's roles continue to expand worldwide. Junior officers, especially the most talented, are becoming dissatisfied with their quality of life and are leaving the military. This causes a great strain in the system designed

to develop future strategic leaders. This is perhaps why the Army decided to mandate mentoring in its doctrine (*Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* [FM-22-100]). However, in order to ensure mentoring would be distributed in a fair and equitable manner (driven in part by civil rights legislation), senior officers were given the responsibility to mentor *all their subordinates* as a way to develop its future leaders.²⁷ This responsibility to mentor all subordinates is assumed to have diluted the effectiveness of mentoring processes.

Core problems are rearranged to the top of each category in accordance with the number of problems (the higher the number, the higher the ranking) each core problem drives. The prevalent symptoms are rearranged in the opposite order (the higher the number, the lower the ranking) at the bottom of each category and are the result of other problems. Porras' technique further identifies problem groupings as "problem stories and themes." 28

A problem story begins with the selection of either an apparent root cause or a highly visible symptom. An example of a problem story is provided in figure 4 (not related to military mentoring). Selecting a root cause (or a highly visible symptom) and its relationships between other problems reveal the problem story. In this example the fundamental problem is identified as internal politics and cliques (S1). The fundamental problem drives at least one other core problem, directly or indirectly. In this case, the fundamental problem (S1) drives the core problem, lack of job security (S3). In addition, the fundamental problem also drives: (a) loyalty (S5, lack of), (b) mistrust (S11), and (c) poor morale and bitterness (S12). Lack of job security (S3) in turn drives the core problem of undefined future goals (O1). Undefined future goals (O1) can be seen to drive other issues: (a) poor morale and bitterness (S12), (b) lack of communication (S10), (c) selective micromanagement (T2), (d) new equipment not used effectively (T4), (e) old equipment (T5, failure to replace outdated equipment), and (f) training (T6, lack of training). The lack of job security (S3) is also defined as a core problem because it drives the core problem of no promotions and selective reorganizations (O2). No promotions and selective reorganizations (O2) then drives: (a) lack of motivation, (b) management does not care (S9), (c) mistrust (S11), and poor morale and bitterness (S12). A problem theme is a set of problem relationships that appear within one of the four dimensional categories. The most prevalent theme in the example is related to social factors.

The Story Problem




FIGURE 4. AN EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM STORY

STREAM ANALYSIS INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

Porras' intervention method was initially applied to a small group of US AWC students on the topic of mentoring. The facilitator, lacking experience, did not set sufficient time aside to complete the stream analysis process, resulting in only a partial understanding of the issues. (The issues were reevaluated more completely using participants in method II.)

STREAM ANALYSIS PARTICIPANTS INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

Ten US AWC students who are considered senior officers participated. Ranks ranged from 0-5 (LTC, CMD, Lt Col) to 0-6 (COL) with the majority being 0-5. Eight of the participants were in the Army, one in the Coast Guard and one in the Air Force. There were nine males and one female present for this phase. All participants signed a "Consent To Serve As A Subject In Research" form.

STREAM ANALYSIS MATERIALS INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

A handout of Table 1, "Description Of Organizational Components In The Stream Organization Model," was provided to all participants to explain the stream analysis process and encourage brainstorming. During the intervention, index cards were used to capture issues related to effective mentoring of junior officers. A large white board was used to capture the issues depicted by the group, in the associated work setting categories. All issues were placed on the white board for all to see and evaluate.

STREAM ANALYSIS PROCEDURE INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

The author acted as facilitator of the process (Navy civilian student attending the US AWC, Class 2002). She prepared the individuals by discussing the handout of table 1 and explaining the process of stream analysis. Members were asked to focus their inputs only on the problems associated with mentoring in the military.

The first part of the process started with members entering their perceived issues onto index cards to maintain anonymity. Each member was asked to provide at least two issues. The cards were collected and mixed up to ensure the input could not be identified with any one person. One by one the index cards were read aloud to the group, then the group would identify which category to place the issue in. The issue in its associated category was recorded onto the white board. Once all ideas were discussed and placed on the white board in the associated category, the second part of the process was to begin.

This second part of the process is to help identify the root causes by connecting an issue (driving force) with the symptom it produces. For example, mentoring terminology/ misunderstanding program (O1) was identified as an issue under organizing arrangements and was also identified as being one of the driving factors behind the symptom associated with false expectations (S12) for both junior and senior officers. Arrows are supposed to be drawn from all relationships the group could find. The arrow should be shown departing from the driving force and the arrowhead shown leading to the symptom it caused. Much discussion occurred and a few more items were added to the list. But few participants agreed on the direction of driving

forces and which symptoms the forces might have caused. This part of the procedure was not completed by agreed adjournment time. The facilitator's lack of experience contributed to the failure to produce effective results. Participants were thanked for their time.

DATA FROM STREAM ANALYSIS INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

The expectation that much of the data collected from the index cards would have been duplicated on subsequent cards (26 issues were collected) rarely occurred during the session.

ORGANIZING			PHYSICAL
ARRANGEMENTS	SOCIAL FACTORS	TECHNOLOGY	SETTING
O1-Mentoring terminology	S1-Window of Relevance	T1-Recuiting	P1-
& Misunderstanding			Constraint
program			to approach
O2-Forced Arrangements	S2-Lack of Understanding of	T2-Age & Experience	*P2-
	Others /Empathy		Geographic
			ally
			Disperse
O3-Rotational Parts	S3-Different Background,	T3 Lack of Training	
	Generation, Race, Gender,		
	Age	T 4 [] - 4 : -	
1	S4-Long-term Commitment	T4-Electronic Communication	
Approach		Methods	
O5-Time Constraints	S5-Rewards Systems/	T5-Informational	
	mentor/ protégé-Recognition		
O6-Process Selection	S6-Favoritism/ Brown-nosing		
		Success	
	S7-Social Activity Declining		
O8-Equality	S8-Proactive Approach		
	Lacking		
	S9-Trustbuilding		
	S10-False Expectations		
	*S11-Unique Relationships		
	*S12-Competitiveness		
	*S13-No choice		
	*S14-Overwhelming Burden		
	*S15-Micromanaging		

TABLE 2. STREAM ANALYSIS DATA INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

(Due to failure to complete the entire process, the placement of items in a column does not represent any particular ranking.)

This indicated the *disperse perceptions* of issues associated with effective mentoring of junior officers by senior officers. Table 2, Stream Analysis Data Intervention (Method I), represents the information collected during this process. Explanations of the terms found in

table 2 are listed in Appendix A, Explanation of Terms. The items read off the index cards were placed in the categories as determined by the participants. Items are given an identifying code starting with an: (a) *O* representing issues placed under organizing arrangements, (b) *S* representing issues under social factors, (c) *T* representing issues under technology, and (d) *P* representing issues under physical settings. (Please note the use of two-digit codes as part of this intervention process was used to distinguish the inputs from the three-digit codes used in table 1. The codes in table 1 will be used as a way of organizing student recommendations, discussed later in this paper.) For example *O1*, is the designation for mentoring terminology/misunderstanding program. Items that have a star proceeding the classification code were added after categorizing comments from method II. These groupings will also be used as the foundation to interpret the data collected from method II, collected from writing essay samples.

MENTORING ESSAY SAMPLE SET (METHOD II)

MENTORING ESSAY PARTICIPANTS (METHOD II)

Colonel Gregg Martin asked members of the student body from US AWC, Class 2002, if they would voluntarily provide copies of their writing samples on the topic of mentoring for evaluation. Sixty-four US AWC students voluntarily provided copies of their essays for review. Senior officer ranks ranged from O-5 to O-6 with the majority at O-5s. Civilian ranks ranged from GS-13 to GS-15, majority undetermined. All participants are considered senior officers or senior civilians.

MENTORING ESSAY MATERIALS METHOD II

All the non-foreign students of the US AWC had to provide a writing sample for evaluation. The same narrative and essay question was provided to all students with a time constraint of three hours to produce their responses either for, against or neutral to the argument. The information used as a basis to develop the response in the writing sample may have introduced a negative bias in the writing sample results. At the end of three hours, all students turned in the writing samples for evaluation of their writing skills. A copy of the information the students were provided follows:

MENTORING?

These days it seems like every professional wants to have a mentor. The belief in a causal connection between having a mentor and becoming successful is so widespread most executives today seem truly convinced that without a mentor even the best professionals will fall behind their more privileged peers and no longer be competitive. In office after office, junior professionals spend extra hours polishing their work just to bring themselves to the favorable attention of their superiors—in the hope of being selected to be someone's protégé.

The Army's focus on mentoring centers less on *having* a mentor than on *being* one. Army doctrine emphasizes the need for leaders to mentor their subordinates. Mentoring, as defined in FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, is "the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity." Mentoring, the "totally inclusive, real-life leader development for every subordinate," requires leaders to "strive to provide all their subordinates with the knowledge and skills necessary to become the best they can be – for the Army and for themselves." Surely junior officers reading these words in doctrine see mentoring written in their future.

Army doctrine makes it clear that Army leaders have a responsibility to develop their subordinates by teaching, counseling and coaching them. In fact, FM 22-100 goes so far as to tell its readers that mentoring subordinates is a leader's moral duty. The manual points out that "subordinates are the leaders of tomorrow's Army...It's your duty to invest the time and energy it takes to help them reach their fullest potential."

Talking to leaders at battalion and below, the manual states that "[a]s a leader, you help your subordinates internalize Army values. You also assist them in developing the individual attributes, learning the skills, and mastering the actions required to become leaders of character and competence themselves. You do this through the action of mentoring." Commanders are told they must "ensure that systems and conditions are in place for mentoring all organizational members," that "constant mentoring and experiential learning opportunities" will be the senior leaders' "greatest contribution – their legacy." This is undeniably sound leadership. But is it mentoring?

The concept of mentoring comes to us from Classical Greece. Homer tells us in The Odyssey of Mentor, chosen by his friend Odysseus to teach, counsel, and coach Odysseus's son, Telemachus, while Odysseus is away at war. Mentor and Telemachus, tutor and pupil for twenty years, together build a relationship of enduring value to them both. The mentor, seeing promise in the pupil, takes a personal interest in the pupil's well-being and contributes toward his future. The protégé, admiring and respecting the mentor, voluntarily follows his counsel, emulates his behavior, and grows through the experiences proffered by the mentor.

In such a long-term relationship based on mutual respect, the wise and willing give and take between the senior and the subordinate is the warp and woof of which the mentoring is woven. Only in the presence of mutual respect and influence can a relationship fabricated over time be mentoring in the classic understanding of the term. Yet FM 22-100 ignores the role of the mentee, omits the responsibilities of the subordinate.

The mentoring relationships studied and written about most widely in professional and academic literature in recent decades are founded on mutual respect and voluntary long-term participation of the mentor and the mentee. Colonel Thomas Kolditz, Professor of Behavioral Science and Leadership (and head of that department) at the US Military Academy, who has studied mentoring relationships, identifies such a relationship as a "lasting [italics added] developmental relationship." MAJ Mike Grojean, Leadership Policy Officer at DCSPER-Human Relations, describes the relationship as a "mutual [italics added] developmental relationship."

Mutuality as a characteristic of the relationship seems only common sense. If a mentoring senior is to successfully influence the learning, experience, and behavior of a protégée, --the protégé must do his part by voluntarily taking steps to assimilate the experiences, follow the guidance, and keep faith with the mentor regardless of the years that may lie between showing potential and achieving mastery.

Current Army doctrine overlooks the enduring, interactive, and reciprocal nature of the relationship between a mentor and a mentee. Is the Army, by presenting mentoring only in terms of the senior leader's actions, rather than in terms of a two-sided, interactive relationship to which *both* participants must contribute, creating false expectations on the part of its junior officers?²⁹

The following is a copy of the instructions for the written assignment based on the topic, *Mentoring?*

USAWC Writing Sample Directions

Write your essay wherever you feel most comfortable doing it. Draft and revise as much as you care to, but submit <u>only</u> your final draft. You may compose in longhand, or you may compose on a PC. Because this writing sample is being used for assessment, do not seek editorial or second-reader assistance. Submit only your <u>final</u> draft to **Room B222** by the time set for you.

<u>For Stubby-Pencil Composers</u>: Use pen or pencil, whatever allows you to write most legibly. Write on one side of lined paper. Number each page, and write your name in the upper right corner of each page. Submit only your final draft-not earlier drafts or outlines. Staple your final draft and submit it flat, unfolded.

<u>For PC Composers</u>: Submit a printed product, not a disk. Leave ample margins and double-space the final text. Number each page, and write your name in the upper right corner of each page. If you do not have time to process final editorial changes on the computer, feel free to pencil in final changes. Staple your final copy and submit it flat, unfolded.

NOTE: The evaluators have no preference regarding a legibly hand-written or a printed copy. Samples submitted in either mode will be judged the same way. Likewise, the evaluators are not concerned about the length of responses. Make your essay as long or short as you believe is necessary to do the job, keeping in mind all other constraints. Ordinarily, an impromptu response of this nature is three to four double-spaced, typed pages.

The evaluators will judge your essay holistically, noting three broad criteria: organization (structure), style (fluency, coherence, readability, word choice, grammar and usage), and content (critical approach, persuasiveness, use of appropriate examples and evidence.)

TOPIC: The author of the short essay on mentoring suggests the Army does not present the concept of mentoring as the term is classically used. Drawing on your own familiarity with the term and with the Army's implementation of the concept, assess the validity of the author's suggestion and answer the question below.

Question: If the Army has embraced only half the concept of mentoring, does the fix lie in modifying the concept or modifying the implementation? Or in neither?

Whatever position you select, be sure to provide evidence or examples to support it. 30

Sixty-four US AWC students voluntarily submitted copies of their essays for evaluation and were used to collect data for method II.

MENTORING ESSAY PROCEDURE (METHOD II)

The author read and extracted information from the submitted essays based on the students' demographics, negative comments, positive comments and recommendations. All essays were initially assigned a number for tracking purposes. This information was placed in Microsoft Access® Database created for this project. However, once information was extracted from the papers, these numbers were obliterated from the documents to protect the author's privacy and returned to COL Gregg Martin for disposition.

Method II is a modified stream analysis method that only utilizes Porras' categories to organize the data. The information was placed into Porras' four work setting categories and then assigned the associated codes for the subcategories established in method I. The author extracted 277 negative comments, 136 positive comments, and 271 recommendations from the sixty-four essays. Some of the extracted information fit into more than one of the subcategories. The author limited the subcategory classifications to no more than two categories. This procedure expanded the negative comments to 348 and the recommendations to 358. (The goal of this process was to identify problems and not to evaluate the successes of mentoring in the

military. Therefore, the 136 positive comments that were extracted were not categorized nor used as part of this evaluation. The author can make these comments available upon written request.) Upon analysis of the 348 negative comments, a few additional subcategories were added to the ones originally developed in table 2 as denoted by a preceding star. There were also 358 recommendations extracted from the essays that will also be used as part of this evaluation.

DATA FROM MENTORING ESSAY REVIEW (METHOD II)

The following three assumptions were made by the evaluator: (a) the wording of the topic essay introduced a negative bias into the sample data, (b) negative experiences are more memorable than positive ones, and (c) under pressure of time constraints, the students rely mostly on their own experiences to devise arguments for, against or neutral to the mentoring topic.

Table 3, General Information Essay Review (Method II), reflects the general information collected based on whether the responses were negative, positive or neutral. None of the responses found in the sample set selected the neutral position. Most papers reflected both positive and negative aspects of mentoring and were classified by the writer's thesis statement or by the greater preponderance of the number of positive comments or negative comments associated with each paper's content. Percents listed next to the numbers represent the populations within a group.

POPULATION n=64	POSITIVE n=18	NEGATIVE n=46
COMMENTS	18 (28.1%)	46 (71.9%)
MALE	17 (94.4%)	37 (80.4%)
FEMALE	1 (5.6%)	9 (19.6%)
ETHNIC MAJORITY	16 (88.9%)	42 (91.3%)
ETHNIC MINORITIES	2 (11.1%)	4 (8.7%)
ARMY	16 (88.9%)	36 (78.3%)
OTHER MILITARY	1 (5.6%)	4 (8.7%)
CIVILIANS	1 (5.6%)	6 (13.0%)

For example of the eighteen positive comments almost 95% were from the males in that group. Likewise, 80% of the population of males in comparison to 20% of the females of the group gave mostly negative comments.

TABLE 3. GENERAL INFORMATION ESSAY REVIEW (METHOD II)

Table 4, Stream Analysis Essay Results (Method II) data represents the results of evaluating only the negative inputs extracted from the sixty-four student papers. The percentages are based on a total of 348 negative comments. Bold-faced items represent subcategories within each of the dimensions that received the highest percentages of comments. Subtotals can be found in the shaded areas for each of the dimensions. For example the organizing arrangement category represents sixty-six percent of all negative comments. The raw data can be found in Appendix B, Negative Comments.

	ORGANIZING				Percen
Code	ARRANGEMENTS	Percent	Code	SOCIAL FACTORS	t
	Mentoring Terminology/				
01	Misunderstanding Program	20.69%	S1	Window of Relevance	0.86%
02	Forced Arrangements	15.52%	S2	Lack of Empathy	0.86%
О3	Rotations	5.31%	S3	Diversity	1.44%
O4	Cookie Cutter Approach	4.89%	S4	Long-term Commitment	6.03%
O5	Time Constraints	4.60%	S5	Rewards/Consequences	1.15%
				Favoritism/Brown-nosing	
O6	Selection	5.46%	S6	/Patronage	5.75%
07	Visibility	0.29%	S7	Socializing	0.00%
08	Equality	9.48%	S8	Proactive Approach	1.15%
	Subtotal OA	66.23%	S9	Trust building	0.86%
					Percen
Code	TECHNOLOGY FACTORS	Percent	Code	SOCIAL FACTORS	t
			S10	False Expectations	6.32%
T1	Recruiting	0.00%	*S11	Unique Relations	0.86%
T2	Age & Experience	0.00%	*S12	Competitiveness/ Downsizing	0.29%
T3	Lack of Training	2.59%	*S13	No Choice	0.86%
T4	Electronic Comm. Methods	0.29%	*S14	Overwhelming Burden	1.15%
T5	Informational Overload	0.00%	*S15	Micromanaging	0.86%
					28.45
*T6	Success Measurements	1.44%		Subtotal SF	%
					Percen
	Subtotal TF	4.31%	Code	PHYSICAL SETTINGS	t
			P1	Constraint to Approach	0.00%
			*P2	Geographical Diversity	0.86%
				Subtotal PS	0.86%

TABLE 4. STREAM ANALYSIS ESSAY RESULTS (METHOD II)-

ANALYSIS (METHODS I AND II)

STREAM ANALYSIS INTERVENTION (METHOD I)

Figure 5, Mentoring Stream Analysis Flow Chart (Method I) depicts the outcome from the first intervention method I. This was the process in which ten volunteers participated in stream analysis and the facilitator did not allow sufficient time. Although much discussion occurred on the subject after issues were placed on the board, there was little agreement as to what issues may contribute to other issues before time ran out. Therefore, an incomplete stream analysis flow chart is depicted. However, a problem theme can be identified in the work-setting dimension of organizing arrangements (OA).

This problem theme is associated with the *formal* work setting; how things are supposed to be done. Two core problems are also identified: (a) misunderstanding the roles, duties, responsibilities, goals and objectives of military mentoring program and the use of mentoring terminology (O1) as employed by the military, and (b) time constraints (O5) posed by increasing personnel and operating tempos.

Misunderstanding the military mentoring program and mentoring terminology (O1) is a core problem and is shown to drive the cookie cutter approach (O4, one size fits all). In addition, misunderstanding the military mentoring program and mentoring terminology (O1) also drives the negative perception of favoritism/brown-nosing/patronage (S6) and the anticipation of false expectations (S10). The other core problem, time constraints (O5), drives: (a) the cookie cutter approach (O4, also), (b) the decline in social activities (S7) that are seen as a way to develop long-term relationships, and (c) the use of electronic communication systems (T4) such as e-mail that remove face-to-face contacts. The use of e-mail is seen as a one-way communication usually devoid of context (without the ability to read each other's body language). Information overload (T5) is identified as one of the *fundamental problems* because it drives the core problem of time constraints (O5). The fundamental problem suggests that the technology that has been used to enhance our life has also complicated it. Senior leaders are faced with acquiring too much information, rather than too little, and feel obligated to sift through the data, leaving little time for tasks such as mentoring.

MENTORING FLOW CHART




FIGURE 5. MENTORING STREAM ANALYSIS FLOW CHART (METHOD I)

(None of the factors are listed in any type of ranking order, which is usually associated with a completed stream analysis flow chart.)

Figure 6, Mentoring Theme and Story depicts part of the theme and part of the problem story originating from information overload (T5). The problem story starts with the effects of *information overload* (T5) that causes time constraints (O5). Time constraints (O5) then drive: (a) use of electronic communication systems which is devoid of human contact (T4), (b) decline in social activity (S7), and (c) use of a cookie cutter approach (O4) rather than personalized mentoring service which is tailored to each individual.

MENTORING THEME & STORY




FIGURE 6. MENTORING ISSUE THEME AND PART OF THE PROBLEM STORY

The author suspects that time constraints (O5) may also drive misunderstanding program/mentoring terminology (O1) by not allowing senior officers sufficient time to develop a mentoring program strategy. Information overload (T5) having too much information to process in a given day drives the issue of time constraints (O5), insufficient time to accomplish tasks. Information overload (T5) is therefore identified as the *fundamental problem* (hidden force driving another core problem). The problem theme is focused in the organizing arrangements dimension of the formal work setting that is associated with goals, strategies, procedures, policies, structure and reward systems. This is also the area responsible for allocating resources.

STREAM ANALYSIS ESSAY (METHOD II)

Table 5 depicts US AWC, Class of 2002's composition in comparison to voluntary essay participants (branch of service, gender, and minority status). Demographics demonstrate that the mentoring writing sample was a representative sample of the US AWC student body in all categories.³¹

UNIFORMED SERVICES	AWC STUDENTS	ESSAY PARTICIPANTS
ARMY	212 (72.6%)	47 (73.4%)
AIR FORCE	26 (8.9%)	4 (6.3%)
NAVY	11 (3.8%)	2 (3.1%)
MARINES	14 (4.8%)	3 (4.7%)
COAST GUARD	1 (0.3%)	1 (1.6%)
CIVILIANS	28 (9.5%)	7 (10.9%)
Subtotal	292 (100.%)	64 (100.%)
INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS (IS)	42	No international students participated in the writing sample.
Total	334	64
GENDER	AWC STUDENTS	ESSAY PARTICIPANTS
MALE (less IS)	260 (89.0%)	54 (84.4%)
FEMALE (less IS)	32 (11.0%)	10 (15.6%)
MINORITY STATUS	AWC STUDENTS	ESSAY PARTICIPANTS
MAJORITY (less IS)	242 (82.9%)	58 (90.6%)
MINORITY (less IS)	50 (17.1%)	6 (9.4%)

TABLE 5. US AWC CLASS COMPOSITION

Table 3, General Information (Method II), refer to page 19, shows that nearly 72 percent of the comments cited negative issues rather than positive issues. However, this negative tendency may have been introduced by the initial "*Mentoring*?" argument or simply because most people tend to remember failures more vividly than successes. The author also makes the

assumption that within the given time constraints (three hours), the students will devise their responses to the mentoring argument based on their own knowledge and experiences.

The following differences were noted in the evaluation of the sampled population: (a) more than three times as many females provided negative comments than positive comments, (b) more than twice as many civilians provided more negative comments than positive comments, and (c) the ethic minorities (all others except Caucasian) and majorities (Caucasian only) responses were not considered significantly different (not any more negative or positive comments when compared to the population that participated in the sample). This data suggests that more females and civilians had more negative experiences with mentoring than a normal distribution would anticipate. Females may have had more negative experiences due in part to the reluctance of males who noted their unwillingness to get involved in long-term mentoring relationships with members of the opposite sex. Some explanation for the disparity in the results for females can be related to some of the comments found in the papers or made during the intervention that included fears that perceptions of: (a) sexual harassment, (b) jealousy exhibited by family members, (c) favoritism or special favors would be felt by other followers, (d) inability to relate to problems of the opposite sex, and (e) less commonality with members of the opposite sex. Some civilians mentioned that mentoring was a word in vogue but no effective program was being administered.

Based on the data collected in Table 4, Stream Analysis Essay (Method II), refer to page 20, the data classified under organizing arrangements, representing the formal organization, contributes to the majority of the military mentoring issues (66%). This result again confirms the *problem theme* is associated with *organizing arrangements*. The formal organization is responsible for developing the goals, roles, responsibilities, policies, procedures, and support systems that help employees achieve the outcomes desired. Although the military advocates mentoring, it has not done an effective job in determining the goals and objectives of mentoring. Of the eight issues listed under organizing arrangement more than half could be grouped under establishment of clearly defined program that depict not only the goals and objectives, but also the roles and responsibilities of both the mentor and protégé. The issues regarding a poorly defined program for mentoring represent fifty-six percent of all negative comments and were determined to be the *fundamental cause* of mentoring issues (O1-mentoring terminology/misunderstanding program [20.7%], O2-forced arrangements [15.5%], O4-cookie cutter approach [4.9%], O6-selection [5.3%] and O8-equity [9.5%]).

Many papers reflected confusion over the differences in the terminology, especially between developmental leadership and mentoring. Mentoring brought forth a classical

connotation of a long-term nurturing advocate that helps to guide one's career. This definition did not seem congruent with the military's construct. Many suggested the term mentoring only led to confusion and false expectations and should not be used or it should not be redefined to fit the military mold. Most felt they had a responsibility to develop leaders but that did not mean the same as mentor them. Colonel Gregg Martin clearly recognized the dilemmas surrounding mentoring in the military. In his draft paper "Mentorship: Meaningful leadership concept, confusing cliché, or euphemism for favoritism?" he accurately describes many of the issues that surfaced in this investigation.³²

More than fifteen percent felt that relationships could not be dictated in doctrine and that chemistry played an important part in developing long-term relationships. In addition, senior officers felt they were not given ample time (9.9%) to attend to the mentoring tasks due to operation tempo (time constraints, 4.6%) and personnel tempo (rotations, 5.3%). In the1990's the military was forced not only to expand its missions globally, but also to decrease its costs. This resulted in flattening management staff while increasing subordinate ratios. With so many subordinates and a great desire to be equitable (9.5%) and fair, only a diluted program was applied, which benefited no one. Junior officers are also expressing concern with the value of mentoring as it has been implemented in the military.

Most of the social factors appear to be symptoms rather than root causes. The three most prevalent social factors (18.1%), false expectations (S10, 6.3%), long-term commitments (S4, 6.0%), and favoritism/ brown-nosing/ patronage (S6, 5.8%), are a direct result of not having a clearly understood mentoring program that defines roles and responsibilities as well as the goals and objectives of mentoring. Junior officers desiring a mentoring relationship as a career-enhancing tool have not been given guidance on their roles and responsibilities and are often cited as being disappointed with mentoring. All are eager at the beginning of their careers but they have not yet learned: *you only get out of any situation what you are willing to put into it.* The author believes that the individual determines his or her own destiny; achievements or failures depend mostly on the individual, not on anyone else.

One of the great difficulties is how to measure the success of mentoring whose foundations are in relationships. Often these measures occur long after mentoring relationships have ended and are based upon hindsight recognition of achievements accomplished later in the protégé's career at a higher level. For mentoring to be successful there should be a way of measuring success in the short-term rather than after the fact. Is retention a factor that should be considered as part of mentoring effectiveness? What happens to the individual's measure of mentoring success when one decides to leave the military and becomes chief executive officer

of one of the Fortune 500 companies. Does this denote military mentoring to be a failure or to be a success? This is perhaps the most difficult question to answer.

Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do (FM22-100) posits mentoring in the Army as requiring senior officers to mentor all subordinates. Can senior officers effectively mentor all subordinates? The doctrine states:

Mentoring is a demanding business, but the future of the Army depends on the trained and effective leaders whom you leave behind. Sometimes it requires you to set priorities, to balance short-term readiness with long-term leader development. The commitment to mentoring future leaders may require you to take risks. It requires you to give subordinates the opportunity to learn and develop themselves while using your experience to guide them without micromanaging.³³

However, it is not be possible to mentor everyone equally. Some junior officers will not want to be mentored. You cannot force an unwanted relationship in doctrine. There may also be danger in propagating tales of famous people who had mentors. For example General Gordon R. Sullivan, a former chief of staff is quoted in doctrine as follows:

George C. Marshall learned leadership from John J. Pershing, and Marshall's followers became great captains themselves: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley...among them. Pershing and Marshall each taught their subordinates their profession; and, more importantly, they gave them room to grow."³⁴

A statement in doctrine like the one above have led many junior officers to believe that they will not be successful unless they have a mentor. The military needs to also propagate success stories of leaders who never had mentors as well. George C. Marshall had many followers. All certainly did not achieve greatness. Only the select few achieved greatness. Where is the equity in the statement above? Yet this example is listed in Army doctrine as one of the benefits of having a mentor. Mentoring can only be truly effective when that certain chemistry is felt between the mentor and the protégé. In addition, a certain amount of drive on the part of the protégé to achieve greatness must also be present. Six percent of the senior leaders from the sample had difficulty envisioning how to maintain a long-term relationship with their subordinates due to the rotational nature of jobs.

B. F. Skinner's operant conditioning reminds us to "reinforce what you want the individual to do again." To reinforce you must be able to reward the individual. Yet there is no system in place to reward successful mentoring relationships without having a way to measure success. The failure to sacrifice short-term tasks for long-term benefits of mentoring is also cited in *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* report that states:

There may also be a culturally based predisposition to short-term, career-enhancing accomplishments at the expense of long-term institutional needs....

They [referring to senior officers] often have little time for mentoring subordinates—a leadership obligation rarely rewarded when it is done well.³⁶

Favoritism/ brown-nosing/ patronage (S6, 5.8%), competitiveness (S12, 0.3%), overwhelming burden (S14, 1.2%), and micromanagement (S15, 0.9%) are all negative connotations (~8%) towards developing meaningful mentoring relationships. These symptoms can be directly attributed to the confusion that surrounds mentoring terminology/ misunderstanding program (O1) and reveals a lack of consistency surrounding mentoring relationships. Fixing mentoring terminology/ misunderstanding program (O1) will never eliminate all perceptions of unfairness but should significantly reduce the incidence.

The most significant finding under technology factors is lack of training (T3, 2.6%). Some stated that not every senior leader was equipped to be an effective mentor. Some senior officers lacked knowledge, skills or abilities. In the author's opinion, mentoring is often misconceived to be a wise old sage providing advice, rather than offering alternative perspectives to problems and then allowing the protégé to chose among many options. Mentoring's intention is to provide learning and growth opportunities. In *Managers as Mentors*, Chip Bell provides a clear understanding of mentoring as a partnership of learning. The book includes a diagnostic to assess mentoring skills and a four-part implementation plan. Once training is accomplished and expectations are clearly defined, many negative connotations surrounding mentoring like false expectations, favoritism, brown-nosing, patronage, micromanagement, and an overwhelming burden can be minimized. But to be able to train, the military must have a clearly defined program that again leads back to the core problem with mentoring terminology/ misunderstanding program (O1).

The physical setting did not appear to contribute significantly to the issues except for mentioning the difficulty in mentoring geographically dispersed subordinates (0.9%). It was clear from the tone of papers that mentoring is most effective when it can occur face-to-face. Electronic communication like e-mail is a one-way conversation where the reader is left to interpret the meaning without reading the person's body language. The effect of having geographically dispersed subordinates made this mentoring task difficult to achieve with any satisfaction. Having geographically dispersed subordinates may not be able to be changed and may be the inherent nature of the military. In this case the physical settings represented only a small number of issues.

FURTHER RESEARCH

In order to perform a comprehensive organizational diagnosis, five additional steps are necessary to complete the process. The first step is to review the interim findings with the senior officer's group. The second step would be to develop the root cause/symptom relationships more thoroughly. During the third step, clarify interpretations and terminology to ensure accuracy in the written and oral communications. In the fourth step, narrow down the focus to perhaps launch an initiative for improving mentoring roles and responsibilities of both the mentor and protégé. The fifth step is to solicit additional participants' recommendations for improvements.

For a complete understanding of the issues it would be important to repeat Porras' stream analysis method with junior officers. The data collected from the junior officers about their issues with mentoring would enhance the understanding of the issues more thoroughly. This has an effect of focusing the improvements where impacts would be the greatest.

(Note: The author believes the interpretation of the raw data was complex and could have been enhanced if additional researchers could have been made available to assist in the analysis.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

The students provided 358 recommendations for improvement to mentoring in military organizations. The 358 recommendations were organized using Porras' stream analysis dimensions as depicted in table 1 and then assigned a subcategory code.

The results of organizing the student's recommendations are depicted in Table 6, Grouped Summary of Student Recommendations. (The raw data is available in Appendix C, Student's Recommendations.) This organization helped focus the overall recommendations to key areas of concern. Recommendations that follow in the body of this paper are not based solely on the student's recommendations, but also on the author's interpretation of all the data collected.

Table Code	ORGANIZING ARRANGEMENTS	Percent	Table Code	TECHNOLOGY	Percent
OA1	Goals	5.9%	TF1	Tools, Equipment & Machinery	0.0%
OA2	Strategies	23.2%	TF2	Technical Expertise	9.8%
OA3	Formal Structure	1.4%	TF3	Job Design	0.8%
OA4	Administrative Polices and Procedures	12.0%	TF4	Work Flow Design	1.1%
OA5	Administrative Systems	0.0%	TF5	Technical Policies & Procedures	0.3%
OA6	Formal Reward Systems	3.9%	TF6	Technical Systems	1.1%
	Total OA	46.4%		Total TF	13.1%
Table Code	SOCIAL FACTORS	Percent	Table Code	PHYSICAL SETTINGS	Percent
SF1	Culture	5.3%	PS1	Space Configuration	0.0%
SF2	Interaction Processes	16.8%	PS2	Physical Ambiance	0.0%
SF3	Social Patterns & Networks	7.8%	PS3	Interior Design	0.0%
SF4	Individual Attributes	10.9%	PS4	Architectural Design	0.0%
	Total SF	40.8%		Total PS	0.0%

TABLE 6. GROUPED SUMMARY OF STUDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

(A three-digit code is used in table 6 to distinguish from the two digit codes that were used in the evaluations of methods I and II that were based on table 2 codes).

Recommendation 1: If the military wants to continue to pursue mentoring as a way to develop strategic leaders, sponsors must clearly define the mentoring program with the goals, strategies and procedures written in doctrine.

More than forty-five percent of the recommendations for improvements were found under the organizing arrangements' dimension. Organizing arrangements indicated goals (AO1, 5.9%), strategies (AO2, 23.7%, implementation methods), and procedures (AO3, 12.0%) represented forty-one percent of the problems. Colonel Gregg Martin, in an article about mentoring, stated "mentorship is not clearly defined nor understood within the Army....the term elicits a variety of responses, including confusion and/or cynicism." Colonel Martin's premises of not having clear terminology and not having a well-developed program were confirmed by this analysis.

Recommendation 2: Discontinue the use of the term, mentoring, that has led to much confusion and substitute the term—learning partnership.

In Chip Bell's *Managers as Mentors*, he equates mentoring to "building partnerships for learning." Currently, the term mentoring as modified by the military carries too many negative

connotations. A better concept for the military to utilize is learning partnerships. A learning partnership does not have to be a long-term relationship, but should have agreed goals. Learning partnerships offer opportunities to share learning beyond one's own command or agency. A learning partnership could be a formalized document between the mentor and the protégé. For example, a protégé might want to improve his or her interpersonal communication skills. A mentor who has identified his or her strengths as interpersonal communication skills is assigned to the protégé. The protégé offers his or her ideas on acquiring these skills. The mentor replies and adds to the list of possible alternative ways to achieve this goal. Upon review, the protégé selects those options that best align with his or her circumstances, and then estimates a completion date. Both the mentor and protégé agree to the formal plan. The protégé reports back to the mentor the encounters and challenges he or she faced in achieving this goal. The mentor provides encouragement, alternative viewpoints and suggestions. Once the protégé accomplishes this goal the contract is completed. (Either mentor or protégé should be able to terminate this contract at any time.) Another contract could be initiated to achieve another goal or to find another mentor. This way the protégé can seek professionals in different fields and is not tied specifically to one person's knowledge and skill levels. This also allows the mentor to expand his or her knowledge base by sharing his or her expertise with diverse people who share their unique problems. Therefore, the term learning partnership best serves the members of the military and aligns well with both operational and rotational tempos.

Recommendation 3: DoD should establish a single web-site program the "DoD Mentoring or Learning Partnership" website modeled after the Department of Transportation's website. The DoD Mentoring website should be distributed across the agencies with each agency contributing training guidance links and mentoring participants with links to other federal agencies such as the Department of Transportation's website.

In Feedback Seeking Behavior and the Development of Mentor-Protégé Relationships, the researchers refer to a survey conducted of 4000 Army officers as part of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report.³⁹ The researchers point out that a "common theme resonating throughout this recent research is that officers do not want mentoring opportunities to be assigned administratively."⁴⁰ To emphasize the importance of mentoring to military members, the following points are restated from the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report:

More than 80% of the officers surveyed felt that mentoring was important to their personal and professional development...Almost 60% of the officers surveyed felt strongly that the Army should increase their emphasis on mentoring...half that number (30%) felt that the Army should create a formal mentoring program.

In fact, 65% of the officers surveyed agreed that informal mentoring sufficiently met their career developmental needs. 41

An on-line mentoring program using the Internet would ensure consistent implementation and equitable training. Members either desiring to be a mentor or to be a protégé can sign-up on line. The program should attempt to match profiles of mentor's strengths and protégé's developmental needs. If done properly, neither mentors nor protégés are tied to any single relationship. If the first relationship does not work, another may be tried. This cycle can go on as long as necessary until a satisfying relationship is built or until one no longer needs or seeks the relationship. However, this method of implementation is not ideal, as most correspondence is one-way via e-mails. But the program offers many benefits of: (a) being voluntary, (b) being perceived as fair and equitable, (c) training convenience (available on-line, any time of day or night), (d) being a non-threatening environment (your mentor does not have to be in your chain of command), (e) allowing more openness (a safe place for protégés to perhaps reveal their weaknesses), (f) providing cross-pollination of knowledge between agencies, (g) establishing consistency (everyone has the same program standards), and (h) minimizing costs.

After careful review of many mentoring websites (governmental, international and professional), the author selected Figure 7, "ONE-DOT"-Mentoring Program website as an example to model the DoD's learning partnership website. 42

U.S. Department of Transportation "ONE DOT" Mentoring Program

A program for all DOT employees, managers and supervisors to volunteer to be a mentor or to search for a mentor

New Mentors and Mentees
Apply to be a Mentor
Apply to be a Mentee

Mentors

Login to the Mentor Area
This will allow you to change your
information, add a mentor/mentee
match and more

Mentees

Login to the Mentee Area
This will allow you to search for a
mentor, change your information,
and more

Information

Secretary's Mentoring Memorandum Mentoring Facts--"Pass it On"

Mentoring Handbook

Instructions

Other DOT Mentoring Sites
United States Coast Guard

Privacy Statement

FIGURE 7. "ONE-DOT"-MENTORING PROGRAM WEBSITE

Recommendation 4: Establish quantifiable measures of success for mentoring programs.

Approximately four percent of the recommendations focused on the lack of a formal reward system. None of the students recommended any suggestions for correcting this problem. Mentoring programs need to have visible measures of success to maintain interest. This is often difficult to achieve where strong relationships are at the heart of the matter. However, the author provides an example of an approach that could be utilized. After establishing a baseline the first year, measure the growth of the following indicators: (a) the number of individuals entering the Internet site (commonly referred to as hits), (b) the number of individuals (both mentors and protégés) who sign-up for the program, and (c) the number of mentor and protégé matches created, (d) the number of completed contracts, (e) the number of individuals seeking on-line training, (regardless of whether or not they sign up for the program), and (f) the number of individuals who complete training on-line. If the program shows growth in these indicators in proceeding years, the sponsors can be satisfied that the program has met the needs of its members. No growth would be an indication of failure. In addition, feedback forms can also be incorporated into the on-line program to evaluate: (a) the progress of an established relationship (perhaps quarterly), (b) the value of the experience at the end of the completion of a contract, and (c) the effectiveness of the on-line training.

It is the belief of the author that individual rewards should be intrinsic in a successful relationship. Formal programs that reward individuals for their roles in mentoring are not recommended, as these types of rewards become the goal rather than the development of strategic leaders. Once a rewards system is established, the policy should be stated clearly.

Recommendation 5: Mentors should be selected based on areas of expertise, not seniority.

The next largest percentage of recommendations fell under the social factors' dimension with forty-one percent. Nearly seventeen percent of these recommendations involved the subcategory of interaction processes. Concepts discussed included who (mentor or protégé) should initiate and who should maintain the mentoring relationship. Some suggested junior officers who desire a relationship should be tasked with initiating the relationship rather than the senior officers. Many recommendations stated that the responsibility for maintaining the relationship should be placed on the junior officer. Others recognized that some junior officers (raised in the information era) have skill sets superior to their supervisors and not need nor desire mentoring services. There may be gender, generational, ethnic and age variables that also inhibit successful mentoring relationships. Leonard Wong points out the differences of interactions between senior officers and junior officers of different generations. What someone

in the boomer generation may value, another in generation X may not even consider worthwhile. ⁴³ In a lecture on *The Fallacy of Top-Down Mentoring,* Colonel Thomas A. Kolditz recognized that mentors could be found in all parts of an organization. Relationships do not have to be limited to the classical notion of senior officer to junior officer, but could also be peer-to-peer or junior officer-to-senior officer. ⁴⁴

Recommendation 6: Mentoring should be completely voluntary, open to all those who have the desire to participate (making the program fair and equitable).

Mentoring is not a program for everybody, nor should it be designed to accommodate everyone. There were perceptions that junior officers would feel they needed to have a mentor in order to succeed in their profession. This can be attributed to not only the legends of successful people having mentors, but also to the big push of mentoring as a cure-all for retention and leader development issues. Yet there are all kinds of successful leaders who have never been mentored.

Others describe many negative connotations to these mentoring interactions as, favoritism, brown-nosing, patronage, riding on the coattails or wings of another. These negative connotations listed under social factors are caused by a lack of *consistency* in the implementation of mentoring which in turn can be related to a lack of training. The lack of training is attributed to having a poorly defined program. A poorly defined program may be the result of the following factors poorly appropriated resources to develop a mentoring program, increased operating tempos, and information overload. These factors constrain the time available to design and effectively administer programs for mentoring.

Recommendation 7: If mentoring terminology is still to be used then, mentoring legends need to be balanced with legends of successful people who were never mentored.

Many officers have achieved greatness without the benefits of mentoring. Too often stories of successful mentoring relationships are publicized. The military needs to publish stories about successful men and women who achieved greatness without a mentor. Lately too much credence has been given to the benefits of mentoring which has created some false expectations for military members. The greatest ingredient for success is a person's own resourcefulness, determination, and persistence. In a quote by Calvin Coolidge:

Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent.⁴⁵

Recommendation 8: Providing training once program is clearly defined is essential to its success. This could be done both consistently and cost effectively by using the Internet as a training site.

In the technology's dimension, nearly ten percent of the recommendations regarded mentoring training. Without adequate training members will not be prepared to accomplish their roles. Some students felt that mentoring required certain characteristics in the mentor that may not be in a person's inherent nature. For example, an introvert (who would question constant reinforcement as being phony) may feel drained by an extrovert's constant need and desire for positive reinforcement. An introvert may not be well equipped to deal with an extrovert's needs without proper training. The lack of training is mainly the result of not having a clearly defined mentoring program.

For the last ten years the military has been operating in a funding-constrained environment, this prevented the full resourcing (means) of the military mentoring program. In a resource-constrained environment, the critical costs accrue when members spend time away from work to participate in classroom, seminar or other types of training. This is why the Department of Transportation's website idea exhibits a cost effective implementation strategy. Training could be accomplished at the time the need arises, and at any time of the day or night.

The physical setting dimension yielded no recommendations for improvement.

Recommendation 9-Information flows, especially e-mail traffic, should be characterized based on urgency similar to the red, yellow, and green flags in use for other programs. Red flags depict urgency, must read now; yellow flags depict important, read within a few days; and green flags depict for information only, read only as you have time.

Information overload is a fundamental problem at the heart of many problems including mentoring. Having too much information can be as great a problem as having too little. Having no acceptable means of sorting through the mounds of information steals quality time from duties like mentoring.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings have confirmed a requirement for a change intervention in the implementation of mentoring in the military. Porras' stream analysis model helped design a framework to interpret the data collected. Even though most of the data was collected from a written exercise that may have introduced a negative bias in the responses; the author believes the data is still valid. An additional assumption made by the author is under the pressure of time

constraints, the students would base most of their responses to the "Mentoring?" argument on their own experiences. The fundamental problem with mentoring in the military can be attributed to having a poorly defined program. However, a deeper, less apparent cause may be that senior officers feel they have too much work to accomplish in any given day. They reported that they receive hundreds of items of information on any given day. Sorting through this information, (in which it is not clear which items are critical and which items are unimportant), leaves little time for developing a mentoring program or for meetings with protégés (T5, information overload). The military will need to look at the issue of information overload to devise a way to categorize information. This is a fundamental issue that is impacting the effectiveness of many programs. In addition, the senior officers face completing many competing tasks. Some tasks. like establishing mentoring programs, lose out to more demanding day-to-day activities. The DoD's requirement to be perceived as being fair and equitable to all its members has only complicated this matter.

The organization has little control over the external environment, but has significant control over its internal environment. The DoD's objective (end) was to use mentoring as a way to build strategic leaders. However, DoD failed to obtain the means (resources) to grow a program that included standardization and training for its members. In addition, DoD has not outlined the expectations or the measurements of success for either the mentor or the protégé. Many of the issues accounted for as social factors appear to be symptoms that would be minimized by clearly designing a mentoring program.

Although mentoring may produce some strategic leaders, it is not the only way to do so. The military or any other organization cannot force relationships through doctrine. The military's concerns for being fair and equitable, the growth in operating and personnel tempos, and the decline in available resources have diluted mentoring to the point that it is of little value to its members. Most members realize that although the military can dictate mentoring relationships in doctrine, these relationships will not grow without chemistry between the mentor and protégé. Relationships must be built upon respect and mutual trust, not doctrine. As a result of this doctrine, some senior officers will: (a) choose not to mentor anyone rather than appear to single out a few, (b) devote more time to those they have chemistry with or to those who show more initiative, (c) simply go through meaningless motions to complete the daunting task, or (d) burn out trying to accomplish the task. Whether the military likes it or not, mentoring will occur naturally, based on the needs of the two individuals involved, and will not necessarily be equitable.

It was clear from the comments that senior leaders welcomed the responsibility for leader development, but they did not believe mentoring all their subordinates was an effective tool. COL Gregg Martin suggests clarifying the terminology by dividing mentoring into three categories, "M1-Professional Mentoring...M2-Long-term Personal & Professional Mentoring...M3-Strategic Mentoring," but unless all military personnel are trained to understand the differences in this terminology, this effort to clarify terminology will be futile. And Many comments suggested doing away with the term *mentoring* since the military is not able to utilize the term in the classical sense. There was confusion between the terms mentoring and leadership. Some students suggested doing a global search and replace the term mentoring everywhere in army doctrine with the term leadership. Many viewed the formalized mentoring relationships in doctrine as unrealistic.

According to one of the students, the Air Force recognized the military's inability to formalize equity in mentoring programs and let their program fade away into obscurity. But the Air Force student made a point to say that although the program has faded away, this does not mean that mentoring does not occur. The Navy also encourages mentoring and has formalized certain aspects. Most of the Navy's leader development programs require the protégé to seek a mentor of their own choosing. The civilian Defense Leadership and Management Program (crossing all service branches) requires its members to have a signed mentoring contract. However, these programs are not designed to be all-inclusive. Those selected for these leadership programs have already competed for their standing. It does not make sense to have an all-inclusive program that is watered down and provides little value to its members. Mentoring, as it exists today in the military, is disappointing to many and filled with negative perceptions of inequality, favoritism, brown-nosing, and patronage.

The requirement for a senior officer to mentor all his subordinates also creates a potentially threatening environment. In this circumstance, the mentor is usually the protégé's rater or at least in his or her chain-of-command. One goal of mentoring is to strengthen a protégé's weaknesses. The comfort level of the protégé to reveal professional or personal weaknesses to someone in his or her own chain-of-command remains problematic at best. The problem of creating a non-threatening environment for the junior officer to flourish in is not practical, when the mentor is also the supervisor (or a superior).

The Department of Transportation, as well as many other organizations, uses the Internet as a tool to overcome obstacles to training, to maintaining equity, to adopting consistent standards, and to creating a non-threatening environment. The Department of Transportation's

Internet site provides on-line mentoring training and establishes a cost-effective and equitable program for mentoring.

Mentoring cannot be accomplished without the proper training. In a commandant's lecture series, on the topic of adaptive leadership, Dr. Jim A. Crupi offered this tidbit of wisdom: "I am not sure leadership can be taught, but I know it can be learned." ⁴⁷ Chip Bell clarifies that mentoring means guiding, not directing. A mentor should help provide the protégé with alternatives, while the protégé is expected to maintain an open mind but is left to decide on his or her own the best course of action. Even if the mentor is aware that the protégé's choices may lead to a set back, the choices should be his or hers: failure is sometimes the best teacher. The mentor must know when to allow the protégé to fail and when to intervene when the risk is too high. Mentoring is a proactive method of learning. Each person must be aware of the benefits and pitfalls that can occur in mentoring relationships. These principles must be taught for mentoring to be successful.

Bell's book provides an initial mentoring skills test to help the reader evaluate his or her readiness to embark upon a mentoring relationship. He also devises a plan for implementing mentoring programs. These tools are useful to any person wanting to be a mentor or a protégé.

Leadership development objectives cross all boundaries at the strategic level. To encourage critical thinking and exposure to many alternatives, the idea of a *DoD learning* partnership website modeled after the Department of Transportations "ONE-DOT" program should be distributed across the agencies with each agency contributing training guidance links and for mentoring participants.

The Department of Defense should continue to encourage voluntary participation in mentoring programs and should implement all nine recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Clearly define any mentoring programs and have the goals, strategies and procedures clearly written in doctrine.

Recommendation 2: Discontinue use of the "mentoring" term and substitute "learning partnership".

Recommendation 3. DoD should consider establishing a single "DoD Mentoring" website modeled after the Department of Transportation's on-line program.

Recommendation 4: Establish mentoring metrics of success.

Recommendation 5: Mentors with areas of expertise should be matched to protégés with areas for growth, regardless of where their positions may be in the organization.

Recommendation 6: Make participation completely voluntary and open to all

Recommendation 7: Balance mentoring legends with legends of success without mentoring.

Recommendation 8: Providing training once program is clearly defined. Consider using the Internet as a cost-effective training site that will allow for standardization of the program.

Recommendation 9-E-mail traffic should be characterized based on urgency similar to the red, yellow, and green flags in use for other programs.

WORDCOUNT=12,384.

APPENDIX A—EXPLAINATION OF TERMS

ORGANIZING A	ARRANGEMENTS	
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
O1	Mentoring Terminology/ Misunderstanding Program	The meaning of the term "mentoring" as modified in doctrine leads to confusion and misunderstanding. Procedural requirements are not clear or undefined. Roles and responsibilities of the mentor and of the protégé are poorly defined.
	Forced	Doctrine requires senior officers to mentor all their subordinates. The relationship is forced and members feel obligated to participate. Senior officers may view mentoring as just another task rather than a desired life-long relationship. Junior officers may not want nor need to be mentored and are allowed no choice. Relationships are built on
O2	Arrangements	mutual respect and trust and cannot be forced.
O3	Rotations	The constraints imposed on developing mentoring relationships due to frequency of turnover, personnel tempo, and operations tempo.
04	Cookie Cutter Approach	The one-size fits all approach to mentoring results in going through the motions and merely checking the box as completed.
O5	Time Constraints	The limited time available for developing mentoring relationships in today's fast-paced society.
O6	Selection	The requirement imposed on a senior officer to select junior officers to mentor. Some selections are perceived as being based on whom you know (good old boy network) rather than what you know. Sometimes the junior officers who need mentoring the most (problem children) are often overlooked.
		To be selected, a protégé must already be successful. Those needing mentoring the most may be the least visible. (Note: This item should be
07	Visibility	combined with O6 Selection.) Mentoring can sometimes appear to display preferential treatment of subordinates. Treating all subordinates equally does not allow mentoring relationships to grow to full potential and therefore is not mentoring. Some suggestions that mentoring relationships can be gender, branch, and race
08	Equality	biased.

SOCIAL FACTORS		
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
	Window of	No clear guidance on the period in time when
S1	Relevance	mentoring a junior officer might be most effective.

SOCIAL FACTORS		
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
S2	Lack of Empathy	It is hard to understand the problems of others with the rich diversity of backgrounds combined with the pressures of job performance. Some junior officers have skill sets that exceed senior officer's abilities.
S3	Diversity	The ability to communicate effectively and promote beneficial use of the cultural, of the ethnical, or of the generational differences. The variation in leadership styles and characteristics that can either enhance or detract from mentoring relationships.
S4	Long-term Com.	Mentoring requires both parties to agree to a long- term commitment.
\$ 5	Rewards/ Consequences	There are neither defined rewards for mentoring successfully nor consequences addressed for failing to mentor subordinates. Behaviors need to be rewarded when successful to assure continence. The problems associated with mentoring need to be addressed.
S6	Brown-nosing	The perception that protégés are mentored because they agree with the leader regardless of the facts (get into good graces with mentor). Diminished time available to attend social events (due to tempo) prevents natural mentoring
S7	Socializing	relationship's development.
S8	Proactive Approach	Belief that junior officers need to take a proactive approach to mentoring and not rely solely on senior officers.
S9	Trust building	Developing trust takes time but junior officers and senior officers will at best share only a 2-3 year window together.
S10	Patronage/ Manipulative	Junior officers question the motives of senior officers. Even when the senior officer attempts to sets up a non-threading environment, the junior officers may still be unwilling to divulge their weaknesses to their superiors.
S11	Favoritism	Mentoring is perceived as being available only to the chosen based on affiliation. Some of the junior officers who are mentored are believed not to have earned the privilege.
S12	False Expectations	Poorly defined programs create false expectations and members are left to envision whatever he or she imagines is the desired outcome.
S13	Unique Relationships	Mentoring is a unique relationship between two people: supervisor, subordinate, peer or other.
S14	Competitiveness	Mentoring causes unwanted competitiveness among junior officers.

SOCIAL FACTORS		
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
S15	No Choice	Doctrine does not allow the options for peer-to-peer or subordinate-to-superior. The superior-to-subordinate relationship is forced rather than desired.
S16	Overwhelming Burden	Senior officers have too many subordinates to effectively mentor. Mentoring becomes a chore rather than a productive relationship.
S17	Micromanagement	Senior officers are getting too involved in the junior officers' day-to-day activities. Rather than guide, they advise (therefore dictate) how things should be done. This action results in negative growth; soon the junior officers are unable to make decisions themselves without advice from senior officers.
TECHNOLOGY		
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
T1	Recruiting	The ability to select the right people to enter the military profession initially.
Т2	Age & Experience	This refers to the generational gaps that can occur in relationships such as the differences between X-ers' versus the boomers' needs. Recognition that some junior officers have knowledge, skills or abilities that exceed those of their senior officer.
Т3	Lack of Training	Some senior officers may not have the acquired the requisite skills or experience to be effective mentors.
Т4	Electronic Comm. Methods	Electronic communication methods may help provide a means of communicating but this way of communication is usually less effective than face-to-face exchanges of information.
Т5	Informational Overload	Too much information is provided on a daily basis. It has become more difficult to narrow down the issues that need attention. This action results in limiting the time senior officers have available to provide effective mentoring.
Т6	Success Measurements	There are no clear measures of success. References to some strategic leaders having had mentors are after the fact and do not help define day-to-day measures of success.

PHYSICAL SETTINGS		
CODE	TABLE 2 LISTING	EXPLANATIONS
P1	Constraint to Approach	The forcing of the relationship between senior officers and junior officers constrains the approach. Junior officers may be disinterested yet the senior officer is forced to approach the junior officer. The junior officer may not want to be mentored by their senior officer but are forced into the relationship when approached.
P2	Geographical Diversity	Senior officers explain that many junior officers under their command are geographically dispersed making it difficult to gather information based on observations, Without these observations it is difficult to provide insight to the junior officer on how best to proceed.

APPENDIX B-NEGATIVE COMMENTS

ORGANIZING ARRANGEMENTS

Legend Information

Legend for codes are explained in Appendix A. Codes refer to items listed in table 2 on page 14. Items with dual codes reflect comments that fall into more than one subcategory and have been replicated under each section that applies. At times some statements might fit into more than two subcategories, however the author limited each statement to no more than two subcategories. Sentences are paraphrases based on actual data collected from the essays.

O1=MENTORING TERMINOLOGY/MISUNDERSTANDING PROGRAM

- O1-Leadership and mentorship are confused in doctrine.
- O1-Leadership and mentorship terms should not be confused.
- O1-Leadership is confused with mentorship.
- O1-Let us (military) not call feedback mentoring.
- O1-Mentoring as used in the military fails short of the true meaning of mentorship.
- O1-Mentoring implementation is flawed.
- O1-Mentoring implementation needs changing.
- O1-Mentoring implementation needs repair.
- O1-Mentoring is a buzzword in industry whether the organization is designed for profit making, for charity, or for government purposes.
- O1-Mentoring is confused with career advice by senior officers to junior officers.
- O1-Mentoring is incorrectly defined in doctrine.
- O1-Mentoring is not the same in Army as in classical mentoring.
- O1-Mentoring is only a part of leadership development and is not all inclusive of that development.
- O1-Mentoring ought to go beyond evaluating junior officers.
- O1-Mentoring requires a deeper understanding of the process.
- O1-Mentorship is a buzzword the Army has used too loosely.
- O1-Mentorship is not required but leadership is.
- O1-Mentorship is not well understood and may not be desirable for the Army.
- O1-Mentorship will not cause men to die for their countries, leadership will. Mentorship and leadership have adverse affects on each other, too much of one and the other fades away.
- O1-Programmatic burdens and a flawed implementation strategy lead to the demise of the Air Force program.
- O1-Revise doctrine on mentoring to include a holistic approach to developing leaders at all levels in the military.
- O1-Senior officers can counsel, but counseling is not mentorship.
- O1-Sincere caring is not part of the field manual definition of mentoring.
- O1-Teaching and counseling are mistaken for mentoring.
- O1-The Army did not and cannot adopt the classical definition of mentoring nor use the classical model of mentoring.
- O1-The Army has not provided the correct level of fidelity to our junior officers. It is not clear how junior officers will actually get mentored at their first duty station.
- O1-The Army's definition of mentoring has deviated from its true meaning.

- O1-The biggest problems facing mentoring are planning and implementing a mentoring improvement plan.
- O1-The creation of mentoring doctrine is problematic due to the extreme scrutiny that the doctrine undergoes; any error in logic or judgment results in its rejection.
- O1-The doctrine fails to address roles of the subordinate.
- O1-The doctrine fails to address the role of subordinate in the mentoring relationship.
- O1-The doctrine fails to ascribe the tasks to the protégé.
- O1-The doctrine fails to define the junior officer's responsibilities.
- O1-The doctrine fails to identify the junior officer's active role in his or her development.
- O1-The doctrine fails to take into account the target audience (junior officers).
- O1-The doctrine ignores the roles of protégé (junior officers).
- O1-The doctrine is correct in charging senior officers with the responsibility to develop junior officers thru teaching, counseling, and coaching, but this is not mentorship.
- O1-The doctrine is one-dimensional in that it fails to fully exploit other dimensions of junior officers to senior officers relationships or of peer-to-peer relationships.
- O1-The doctrine is unclear on what mentoring is and to whom it applies.
- O1-The doctrine lacks clear instructions on the protégé's roles.
- O1-The doctrine needs to spell out the importance of the junior officer's role.
- O1-The doctrine's current language used to define mentorship is problematic.
- O1-The document adds confusion when stating, "mentoring is the proactive development of each subordinate," and then uses the same exact definition under leadership development.
- O1-The junior officers are confused when a distinction is not made between leading and mentoring. This muddles the water and detracts from teaching the basics of military leadership. This distinction is clear to senior officers but not to novices (junior officers).
- O1-The junior officer's role is not discussed in doctrine.
- O1-The mentoring term is often misunderstood.
- O1-The military needs to improve its implementation of mentoring.
- O1-The military needs to improve upon the concept of mentoring.
- O1-The military needs to modify the implementation of mentoring programs in the military.
- O1-The military should refocus the mentoring process to include clear responsibilities for active participation of junior officers.
- O1-The military should review the Army definition of mentoring vice the classical definition.
- O1-The roles of mentor and the mentoree need to be defined.
- O1-The roles of the junior officers are ignored in doctrine.
- O1-The senior officers seldom offer mentoring services. They are mostly advisors, not real mentors.
- O1-The senior officers should be expected to adopt the leadership style of mentoring.
- O1-There is a faddish aspect to mentoring that was latched from industry's use in succession planning.
- O1-There is a perception that mentorship and leadership are the same, but they are not.
- O1-There is an unrealistic operational definition of the mentoring term.
- O1-There is confusion between the terms leadership and mentorship.
- O1-While mentoring is espoused in Air Force there is no formal program.

- O1/O2-The doctrine ignores the role and the responsibilities of the protégé.
- O1/O2-The roles and the responsibilities for the protégé are unclear.
- O1/O3-Is there any consistency in mentoring if junior officers are forced to have multiple mentors of short duration with each rotation?
- O1/O6-The doctrine should provide clearer distinctions among mentorship, leader development and leader selection.
- O1/O8-One cannot evenly distribute classical mentoring.
- O1/O8-Problems are created with the doctrine's definition of mentoring as, "the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity."
- O1/O8-The Army's sense that more is better when it comes to mentoring is in conflict with the classical sense; more is not necessarily better in this case.
- O1/S4-The doctrine overlooks the requirement for long-term relationships between mentor and protégé.
- O1/S10-False expectations are created due to the unclear definition of mentoring.
- O1/S15-The doctrine leads to micromanagement of junior officers.
- O1/T6-The doctrine lacks development of short-term goals, of objectives and of evaluation methods.
- O1/T6-What are the desired outcomes from mentoring? (Goals)

02=FORCED ARRANGEMENTS

- O2-Classical mentoring relationships are based on the selection of a few members. These selections were based on love and commitment, not feelings of job responsibilities nor of doctrine requirements.
- O2-Formalization of a personal process risks violating many of the Army tenets that are held dearly.
- O2-If we (military) force selection, how do we ensure the mutual respect necessary for enduring relationships?
- O2-Mentoring cannot be delegated to executive officers.
- O2-Mentoring cannot be formalized and assigned with mandated topics in a group setting.
- O2-Mentoring is a two-way street in which both senior officers and junior officers form an informal relationship.
- O2-Mentoring is not just responsibility of senior officers. It is an exchange between junior officers and senior officers.
- O2-Mentoring needs to be a two-sided relationship in which both parties contribute.
- O2-Mentoring relationships are much more personal than what doctrine describes.
- O2-Mentoring relationships cannot be designated: relationships must be developed.
- O2-Mentoring relationships comes from the heart and cannot be dictated in manuals.

- O2-Mentoring relationships usually should be established outside the context of the chain-of-command of the junior officers.
- O2-Mentoring roles are completely one-sided.
- O2-Mentors cannot be assigned.
- O2-Mentors cannot be dictated.
- O2-Mentors develop relationships through a desire to teach and to develop friendships and not out of moral duty but out of common interest, of shared worldviews, or of similar values.
- O2-Not all junior officers and senior officers have mutual respect for each other.
- O2-The Air Force's program like Army's program fails to accomplish its intended goal. The program is flawed in its mandatory downward direction that is one-sided (top-down direction).
- O2-The Army assignments for mentoring are rarely by mutual choice of the parties.
- O2-The doctrine ignores the human relationship that is the center of classical mentoring.
- O2-The doctrine exhorts leaders to be mentors.
- O2-The doctrine fails to address obligations of junior officers.
- O2-The doctrine fails to include expectations for both mentor and protégé.
- O2-The doctrine neglects the responsibility for junior officers in the mentoring relationship.
- O2-The doctrine places sole responsibility for mentoring on senior officers.
- O2-The doctrine presents a one-sided relationship.
- O2-The doctrine should place responsibilities for mentoring on both parties.
- O2-The doctrine uses a single-sided focus on the senior officer's responsibilities only.
- O2-The military deviated from the concept of mentoring by making senior officers senior solely responsible for the relationship.
- O2-The military should not implement a plan that is designed to fail. Mentors cannot be assigned by doctrine.
- O2-The military's assignment of mentors fails to allow protégé to seek someone admired and trusted.
- O2-The military's implementation of mentoring process focuses too much emphasis on the senior officers.
- O2-The senior officers cannot be responsible for everything.
- O2-The single-sided approach places greater responsibility on senior officer's role as the mentor.
- O2-The system cannot mandate relationships of the heart.
- O2-Unreasonable emphasis is placed on senior officer's role in developing mentoring relationships.
- O2/O1-The doctrine ignores the role and the responsibilities of the protégé.
- O2/O1-The roles and the responsibilities for the protégé are unclear.
- O2/O4-Not all junior officers and senior officers desire mentoring relationships.
- O2/O4-Not every junior officer needs or wants a mentor.
- O2/O4-Not every senior officer is cut out to be a mentor.
- O2/O4-The doctrine cannot legislate mentoring, unless it can become a norm; otherwise it's just another job.

- O2/O6-The doctrine fails to capture the reciprocal nature of the relationships of peers and of junior officers to senior officers.
- O2/O6-The junior officers may not want to be mentored.
- O2/O6-There is a problem in requiring senior officers to initiate mentoring relationships.
- O2/O6-There is no expectation that the senior officer might learn from a junior officer.
- O2/O8-For the military the more difficult challenge requires acceptance that mentoring is not a "fair" or an "equal opportunity" program. Mentoring is a special relationship that might occur and develops overtime and cannot be mandated.
- O2/O8-Leaders should not be wasting time and resources by being spread to thin by the expectation that they must mentor everyone; whether they like it or not.
- O2/O8-Mentoring cannot be formally required for all junior officers.
- O2/O8-The Army cannot equitable administer a program whose true basis is voluntary and long-term; some will participate and some will not.
- O2/O8-The doctrine places all responsibility on senior officers.
- O2/O8-There is an assumption that everyone wants to be mentored.
- O2/S4-The doctrine has defined mentoring as focused on the responsibility of senior officers to mentor junior officers and what is absent is mutual respect and voluntary long-term participation, as in the classical sense.
- O2/S11-Relationships are not subject to written doctrine.

O3=ROTATIONS

- O3-Is it not practical for relationships to last beyond a single rotation.
- O3-Mentoring relationships must transcend rotations, retirements and junior job changes. These rotations affect the influence that the senior officer has over the junior officers and reduces the effectiveness of teaching, coaching, and counseling.
- O3-Mentors and pupils can only expect two to three years of positive experiences and direct contact before one or both are transferred to new locations.
- O3-Numerous deployments and officer rotations limit the effectiveness of developing mentoring relationships.
- O3-The Army assignments are too short for relationships to form and persist more than one or two years.
- O3-The increase in operating tempos contributes to ineffective mentoring.
- O3-The joint operations leave little opportunity to acquire desired mentors from the Army.
- O3-The junior officers have limited exposure to the senior officers during assignments (four to six year rotations in the Coast Guard).
- O3-The operating tempos makes mentoring more challenging and complex.
- O3-Tours force senior officer's and junior officer's relationship to short durations. This duration is insufficient to develop a relationship that is both interactive and enduring.
- O3/O1-Is there any consistency in mentoring if junior officers are forced to have multiple mentors of short duration with each rotation?

O3/S4-Although simple in theory, mentoring is difficult to accomplish. It is difficult to maintain a long-term relationship because of the constant moving, the changing jobs, the varying intensity of specific jobs and the growing family responsibilities.

O3/S4-It is difficult to establish long-term relationships due to military rotations.

O3/S4-Long-term relationships are a challenge in military due to heavy turnover.

O3/S4-The rotations and retirements constrain development of long-term relationships.

O3/S4-The rotations make long-term relationship difficult to maintain. The communication usually ends with rotation.

O3/S4-There is an expectation for development of long-term commitments that are difficult to maintain in an environment that frequently relocates.

O3/S4-Transient lifestyles make long-term relationships difficult to maintain.

O3/P2-Long-term relationships cannot be built in short rotations. It becomes even more difficult to achieve the long-term duration over great distances.

O4=COOKIE CUTTER APPROACH

O4-Meaningless addition to a manager's daily duty.

O4-Mentoring has developed into simply checking the box activity.

O4-Mentoring large numbers of junior officers is reduced to just going through the motions even if they find a mentor at all.

O4-The gap between what is said about mentoring and what is done, in the field in regards to mentoring, is quite large.

O4-The mentoring process is done less genuinely; it's done just to complete the square.

O4-There is an overarching perception of junior officers needing to have a mentor.

O4/O2-Not all junior officers and senior officers desire mentoring relationships.

O4/O2-Not every junior officer needs or wants a mentor.

O4/O2-Not every senior officer is cut out to be a mentor.

O4/O2-The doctrine cannot legislate mentoring, unless it can become a norm; otherwise it's just another job.

O4/O5-The unrelenting operating tempo has limited the time available for mentoring junior officers; results in just checking the box.

O4/O6-Not all persons in the position to mentor are good at it.

O4/O8-By requiring all senior officers to mentor all junior officers the Army has eliminated the uniqueness of the mentoring relationship. Mentoring becomes simply an extension of performance reviews and nothing more.

O4/O8-Relationships cannot be metered out to all without watering down mentoring to something that becomes insignificant.

O4/S3-The program fails to recognize the variety of leadership styles, personalities, demographics, education and dispositions that play an effective role in mentoring. One style does not fit all.

O4/S6-Mission execution is always placed above developing leaders in the military, reducing mentoring to just lip-service.

O4/S14-Mentoring has become a buzzword and just another item on the to do list.

O5=TIME CONSTRAINTS

- O5-There is a challenge in the military to find enough time to develop relationships, so that relationships will flourish and for the members to obtain mutual benefits.
- O5-The day-to-day events limit time available to mentor.
- O5-The hardest part is how to make the mentor available for the process (time impacts commitment).
- O5-The junior officers are mentored for a limited time and then thrown back into the mentoring needs pool.
- O5-Mentoring is not practical in our high paced world.
- O5-Mentors have no time available to mentor.
- O5-Non-tactical assignments strip units of time needed to grow and develop. Mentorship cannot make up for this lost time. The root of the problem is that mentoring is a band aide approach.
- O5-The senior officers are sometimes making themselves unavailable to mentor.
- O5-The senior officers have limited time to mentor.
- O5-The senior officers have time constraints that limit the time available to mentor and are a result of managing limited resources, of growing spans of control, and of increasing operating tempos.
- O5-The time spent on mentoring is minimal.
- O5/O4-The unrelenting operating tempo has limited the time available for mentoring junior officers; results in just checking the box.
- O5/O8-The senior officer is required to mentor all his or her junior officers. Senior officers neither have the time nor the capacity to effectively mentor all junior officers.
- O5/O8-The senior officers do not have an unlimited amount of time to mentor everyone.
- O5/S4-Time is needed to develop lasting relationships.
- O5/S14-Mentoring is a burden of giving of oneself and of making yourself available.

O6=PROCESS SELECTION

- O6-In most Army units' relationships are not always possible within the limited construct of the leader's roles and of the subordinate's affiliation.
- O6-The junior officer's extra effort for senior officer's recognition may be for reasons other than hopes to be selected as a protégé by senior officers.
- O6-the junior officers feel they have to be selected based on some special promise.
- O6-Mentor or no mentor most officers will get promoted. The positions of 1st Lieutenant and of Captain levels are almost guaranteed (98%). Promotions are just another bureaucratic procedure to meet the Army's needs.

O6-Being mentored is perceived as a requirement for holding certain jobs that enhance a junior officer's advancement.

O6/O1-The doctrine should provide clearer distinctions among mentorship, leader development and leader selection.

O6/O2-The doctrine fails to capture the reciprocal nature of the relationships of peers and of junior officers to senior officers.

O6/O2-The junior officers may not want to be mentored.

O6/O2-There is a problem in requiring senior officers to initiate mentoring relationships.

O6/O2-There is no expectation that the senior officer might learn from a junior officer.

O6/O4-Not all persons in the position to mentor are good at it.

O6/O7-To experience special mentoring relationships, the Army will have to change its current accession and promotion policies. In addition, the Army will have to retreat from the position that an officer is his own best personal manager.

O6/O8-The single-sided approach to matching mentors and protégés is awkward and quite unfair in today's equal opportunity environment.

O6/S1-Mentoring is needed most when a junior officer makes mistakes. Yet mentors select junior officers who show promise by not making mistakes.

O6/S1-Mentoring occurs usually after you leave the squadron, when you find yourself calling upon your former senior officer for advice. Seeking advice of a senior officer does not usually occur during the time you work with him or her.

O6/S6-Mentoring causes the selection of a few chosen members that results in frustration and contributes to people leaving service.

O6/S6-Mentoring is perceived as a senior officer looking out for a few of his or her junior officers. The "good ole boy" system is at work. This system corrupts promotions and command selection as the best-qualified are sometimes passed over for the select few.

O6/S6-The military has a good ole boy network with the fair-haired children getting selected for all the good jobs and are also getting promoted over their peers. Making it to the top leads to dissention, deterioration of respect for senior officers and perhaps early departure by disheartened soldiers.

O6/S13-The protégé desires and wants to participate in the selection of a mentor process rather than relying on being selected by a senior officer.

07=VISIBILITY

O7/O6-To experience special mentoring relationships, the Army will have to change its current accession and promotion policies. In addition, the Army will have to retreat from the position that an officer is his own best personal manager.

O8=EQUALITY

- O8-There is a belief in the military that all officers need mentoring.
- O8-Classical mentoring is in conflict with Army's doctrine on fairness, on equal opportunity, and on openness of the leader.
- O8-If we advocate individual choice, how do we prevent prejudice or stereotyping from excluding or limiting relationships?
- O8-It is impossible to provide personal and intimate contact to all subordinates.
- O8-Mentoring all subordinates is an impossible task.
- O8-Mentoring is not meant for the masses.
- O8-Some leaders either knowingly or unknowingly may have engaged in "selective mentoring."
- O8-The senior officers cannot mentor everyone equally.
- O8-The senior officers have too many junior officers to mentor equally.
- O8-The senior officers have too many junior officers to mentor effectively.
- O8-There is disparity between number of personnel available to mentor and the number of personnel needing mentoring.
- O8/S6-True mentoring benefits only a select few.
- O8-True mentoring requires spending time with a subordinate of exceptional promise or who has a desire to excel; mentoring is not intended for everyone.
- O8-You cannot mentor all your junior officers; you are developing and training them. You can only mentor a select few junior officers.
- O8/O1-Problems are created with the doctrine's definition of mentoring as, "the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity."
- O8/O1-One cannot evenly distribute classical mentoring.
- O8/O1-The Army's sense that more is better when it comes to mentoring is in conflict with the classical sense; more is not necessarily better in this case.
- O8/O2-For the military the more difficult challenge requires acceptance that mentoring is not a "fair" or an "equal opportunity" program. Mentoring is a special relationship that might occur and develops overtime and cannot be mandated.
- O8/O2-Leaders should not be wasting time and resources by being spread to thin by the expectation that they must mentor everyone; whether they like it or not.
- O8/O2-Mentoring cannot be formally required for all junior officers.
- O8/O2-The Army cannot equitable administer a program whose true basis is voluntary and long-term; some will participate and some will not.
- O8/O2-The doctrine places all responsibility on senior officers.
- O8/O2-There is an assumption that everyone wants to be mentored.
- O8/O4-By requiring all senior officers to mentor all junior officers the Army has eliminated the uniqueness of the mentoring relationship. Mentoring becomes simply an extension of performance reviews and nothing more.
- O8/O4-Relationships cannot be metered out to all without watering down mentoring to something that becomes insignificant.

O8/O5-The senior officer is required to mentor all his or her junior officers. Senior officers neither have the time nor the capacity to effectively mentor all junior officers.

O8/O5-The senior officers do not have an unlimited amount of time to mentor everyone.

O8/O6-The single-sided approach to matching mentors and protégés is awkward and quite unfair in today's equal opportunity environment.

O8/S4-Senior officers are expected to practice leadership everyday with all their junior officers and cannot be expected to develop lasting relationships with more than a just a few.

O8/S6-True mentoring benefits only a select few.

O8/S6-Voluntary and long-lasting terms bring harm to the program. There are haves and have-nots. The haves are perceived by the have-nots as getting special attention and as being favored.

O8/S10-Telling all soldiers they will be mentored is misleading and promotes false expectations.

O8/S10-There are unrealistic expectations that senior officers should mentor every junior officer and that every junior officer has the right to be mentored.

SOCIAL FACTORS

S1=WINDOW OF RELEVANCE

S1/O6-Mentoring is needed most when a junior officer makes mistakes. Yet mentors select junior officers who show promise by not making mistakes.

S1/O6-Mentoring occurs usually after you leave the squadron, when you find yourself calling upon your former senior officer for advice. Seeking advice of a senior officer does not usually occur during the time you work with him or her.

S1/T3-There is an expectation that senior officers will know what to do, how to do it and when to do it.

S2=LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS / EMPATHY

- S2-The junior officers asking for help are perceived as weak.
- S2-The leader may not have been mentored during his or her career. Since they did not need help to further their career, they assume others do not need their help.
- S2-Today's junior officers have negative opinions of their senior officers. They are more free thinkers than when current senior officers were at the same junior officers' levels.

S3=DIFFERENT BACKGROUND/ GENERATION/ RACE/ GENDER / AGE

S3-There is a generational gap. Junior officers' expectations, professional desires and work ethics differ from senior officers when they were junior officers. Junior officers need to be kept informed and will not follow orders blindly.

- S3-There is significant problems in mentoring entire populations of personnel. Minority populations tend to not venture outside their ethnic groups or grasp the diversity of experiences available.
- S3-A stove piped system of mentoring was established and endangered the prospects of bridging the cultural divide.
- S3-Mentoring is often tied to ethnicity and school affiliation rather than a phase in development required for every member of the military organization.
- S3/O4-The program fails to recognize the variety of leadership styles, personalities, demographics, education and dispositions that play an effective role in mentoring. One style does not fit all.

S4=LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

- S4-It is impossible for senior officers to create an Army environment that limits number of protégés while at the same time mandates long-term relationships.
- S4-Mentoring cannot be accomplished in the short-term.
- S4-Mentoring is a long-term voluntary relationship based on respect and mutual interests.
- S4-Mentoring is forged over years of development.
- S4-The Army's leaders and subordinates fail to follow through with long-term mentoring relationships that require a lifetime commitment; it's not just during a tour of duty.
- S4-There are few opportunities to develop classical long-term relationships.
- S4-Today's fast pace society precludes development of long-term relationships.
- S4-True mentoring relationships last for years through various stages in one's career.
- S4-Voluntary long-term participation in mentoring is flawed.
- S4/O1-The doctrine overlooks the requirement for long-term relationships between mentor and protégé.
- S4/O2-The doctrine has defined mentoring as focused on the responsibility of senior officers to mentor junior officers and what is absent is mutual respect and voluntary long-term participation, as in the classical sense.
- S4/O3-Although simple in theory, mentoring is difficult to accomplish. It is difficult to maintain a long-term relationship because of the constant moving, the changing jobs, the varying intensity of specific jobs and the growing family responsibilities.
- S4/O3-It is difficult to establish long-term relationships due to military rotations.
- S4/O3-Long-term relationships are a challenge in military due to heavy turnover.
- S4/O3-The rotations and retirements constrain development of long-term relationships.
- S4/O3-The rotations make long-term relationship difficult to maintain. The communication usually ends with rotation.
- S4/O3-There is an expectation for development of long-term commitments that are difficult to maintain in an environment that frequently relocates.
- S4/O3-Transient lifestyles make long-term relationships difficult to maintain.
- S4/O5-Time is needed to develop lasting relationships.

S4/O8-Senior officers are expected to practice leadership everyday with all their junior officers and cannot be expected to develop lasting relationships with more than a just a few.

S5=REWARD SYSTEMS / MENTOR/PROTÉGÉ RECOGNITION

- S5-Mentoring has no apparent reinforcement program.
- S5-Mentoring has no enforcement of policies or programs.
- S5-The consequence of ignoring this task (mentoring) is overwhelming.
- S5-The junior officers' perceive not having a mentor as a disadvantage.

S6=FAVORITISM/BROWN-NOSING/PATRONAGE

- S6-Hard found information is made available to the lucky protégé long before it was available to others, giving that person a decided advantage over others.
- S6-Many officers become mirror images of their mentors. They fail to make professional and personal changes that are needed and thereby they replicate the errors of their mentors.
- S6-Mentoring has developed negative connotations of "implied careerism" getting ahead by whom you know, not what you know.
- S6-Mentoring is perceived as being a "sugar daddy" system.
- S6-Perceptions of many junior officers are that senior officers play favorites and are spending more time with some people and less time with others. This creates an environment of resentment and undermines the mentoring process.
- S6-Senior officers are more concern with developing junior officers in current tasks and are not necessarily concerned with developing junior officers for future tasks or for future leadership.
- S6-The Army is "selling" mentorship to commanders as a way to get around allowing junior officers to spend more time in their tactical units.
- S6-The junior officers do not want and should not be dotted over by their "mother" commander.
- S6-The junior officers feel that they can ride on the coat tails of their mentors to success.
- S6-The outcome of mentoring programs is the selection of officers to perform duties that are needed to complete the mission rather than for the junior officer's development.
- S6-The protégés should not perceive that they are able to ride on the coat tails of his or her senior officer.
- S6-The senior officer's focus is on task accomplishment, not on the intellectual growth of junior officers.
- S6/O4-Mission execution is always placed above developing leaders in the military, reducing mentoring to just lip-service.
- S6/O6-Mentoring causes the selection of a few chosen members that results in frustration and contributes to people leaving service.
- S6/O6-Mentoring is perceived as a senior officer looking out for a few of his or her junior officers. The "good ole boy" system is at work. This system corrupts promotions and command selection as the best-qualified are sometimes passed over for the select few.

S6/O6-The military has a good ole boy network with the fair-haired children getting selected for all the good jobs and are also getting promoted over their peers. Making it to the top leads to dissention, deterioration of respect for senior officers and perhaps early departure by disheartened soldiers.

S6/O8-True mentoring benefits only a select few.

S6/O8-Voluntary and long-lasting terms bring harm to the program. There are haves and have-nots. The haves are perceived by the have-nots as getting special attention and as being favored.

S6/S8-Mentoring should not be a free ride: it takes effort.

S6/S9-Perceptions of mentoring fragment teams, foster distrust and dissention. Junior officers who are seeking mentoring relationships are confused by peers who call such actions "brown nosing" and "apple polishing."

S7=SOCIAL ACTIVITY DECLINING

S8=PROACTIVE APPROACH LACKING

S8-Senior officers cannot provide a road map to success. It is not a step-by-step process. Junior officers must set their own goals and aspirations.

S8-You can only mentor the willing.

S8-Mentoring is a two-sided interactive relationship that both the senior officers and the junior officers contribute.

S8/S6-Mentoring should not be a free ride: it takes effort.

S9=TRUSTBUILDING

S9-Protégé's and mentor's relationships must be founded on mutual respect. Senior officers have an obligation to provide feedback, coach and counsel to develop junior officers. This is different from mentoring in that it does not require proof of mutual respect.

S9-Relationships based on mutual respect and confidence to maintain trust does not exist in the military.

S9/S6-Perceptions of mentoring fragment teams, foster distrust and dissention. Junior officers who are seeking mentoring relationships are confused by peers who call such actions "brown nosing" and "apple polishing."

S10=FALSE EXPECTATIONS

- S10-The Army's mentoring concept creates false expectations.
- S10-Mentoring has created false expectations for junior officers.
- S10-Mentoring creates false expectation for both senior officers and junior officers.
- S10-The doctrine creates false expectations about the practice of mentoring with both junior officers and with senior officers.
- S10-Mentoring creates false expectations in the junior officer.
- \$10-Mentoring causes the creation of false expectations in junior officers.

- S10-Mentoring creates disillusions with the military profession because it generates false expectations.
- S10-Gaps are created. Mentoring generates false expectations on the part of the junior officers and increases stress on the part of the senior officers, as together they fail to achieve requirements of doctrine.
- S10-If a mentor fails to invest fully in the junior officer's development, the junior officers feel that they are not able to achieve their full potential.
- S10-The junior officers sense that a senior officer will provide a recipe for success.
- S10-Mentoring is viewed as something magical that is needed to accomplish one's mission.
- S10-Mentorship is perceived to be all and end all type of professional development and this is bunk.
- S10-Need to close the gap that is creating false expectations on part of junior officers.
- S10-There is poorly defined expectations for both mentor and protégé.
- S10-Mentoring needs to provide junior officers with more realistic expectations.
- S10-Mentoring sets up junior officers for a perceived advantage.
- S10-The junior officers should expect leadership, not mentorship.
- S10/O1-False expectations are created due to the unclear definition of mentoring.
- S10/O8-Telling all soldiers they will be mentored is misleading and promotes false expectations.
- S10/O8-There are unrealistic expectations that senior officers should mentor every junior officer and that every junior officer has the right to be mentored.
- S10/S13-False expectations are created in the random matching of senior officer to junior officer.
- S10/P2-There is an unreasonable expectation for mentoring geographically dispersed units vice traditional units.

S11=UNIQUE RELATIONSHIPS

- S11-The challenge of mentoring is focused around two individuals developing a special relationship.
- S11-Mentorship needs to focus on a unique relationship.
- S11/O2-Relationships are not subject to written doctrine.

S12=COMPETITIVENESS

S12-Downsizing has caused severe competitiveness. The competitiveness causes senior officers to pay more attention to their own jobs than to the development of leaders.

S13=NO CHOICE

S13-The junior officer must select the senior officer as a mentor. This policy lacks choice.

S13/O6-The protégé desires and wants to participate in the selection of a mentor process rather than relying on being selected by a senior officer.

S13/S10-False expectations are created in the random matching of senior officer to junior officer.

S14=OVERWHELMING BURDEN

S14-The expanded effort needed to mentor junior officers causes senior officers to neglect their own jobs.

S14/O4-Mentoring has become a buzzword and just another item on the to do list.

S14/O5-Mentoring is a burden of giving of oneself and of making yourself available.

S14/T6-An overwhelming burden is placed on senior officers to implement mentoring programs. The Air Force even developed metrics for measuring mentor effectiveness.

S15=MICROMANAGING

S15-Mentorship has been used to tell junior officers how to do their jobs better. The boss becomes involved in junior officer's affairs and becomes the de facto leader (overmentoring boss).

S15-The junior officers leaving the Army report micromanagement as one of their reasons. Micromanagement is the scourge to every professional officer and kills command autonomy, responsibility, and ability to act on your own accord.

S15/O1-The doctine leads to micromanagement of junior officers.

TECHNOLOGY

T1=RECRUITING

T2=AGE AND EXPERIENCE

T3=LACK OF TRAINING

T3-Being a mentor is more than taking care of junior officers desires.

T3-Entry into officer ranks is through various programs. None of these programs encourage cadets to go out and find someone to help them through the process of becoming an officer. These programs are currently sterile, running participants through a series of tests, leadership tasks and teachers evaluations.

T3-There is neither training nor guidance on mentoring.

T3-Once selected, it is assumed that senior officers will know how to develop junior officer's special skills.

T3-Mentoring should not be a directed training event.

T3-Some junior officers know they need to be mentored while others do not.

TECHNOLOGY

T3- The Army's training and leadership development panels and the company commander's task force studies support the findings of poor mentoring in the military.

T3-When training is mandatory and topics are rehashed, the junior officers become bored with the learning process.

T3/S1-There is an expectation that senior officers will know what to do, how to do it and when to do it.

T4=ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION METHODS

T4-The electronic mail is no substitution for face-to-face discussions.

T5=INFORMATION OVERLOAD

T6=MEASUREMENT OF SUCCESS

T6-There is a lack of accountability for mentoring programs. There is no method to evaluate senior officers as mentors.

T6-The passage of skills is difficult to measure.

T6/O1-The doctrine lacks development of short-term goals, of objectives and of evaluation methods.

T6/O1-What are the desired outcomes from mentoring? (Measures)

T6/S14-An overwhelming burden is placed on senior officers to implement mentoring programs. The Air Force even developed metrics for measuring mentor effectiveness.

PHYSICAL SETTINGS

P1=CONSTRAINT TO APPROACH

P2=GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED

P2-Many battalions are geographical dispersed making interaction difficult to maintain.

P2/O3-Long-term relationships cannot be built in short rotations. It becomes even more difficult to achieve the long-term duration over great distances.

P2/S10-There are unreasonable expectations for mentoring geographically dispersed units vice traditional units.

APPENDIX C-STUDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

ORGANIZING ARRANGEMENTS

Please note all definitions that appear in this appendix were derived from information found in Jerry I. Porras' *Stream Analysis: A Powerful Way to Diagnose and Manage Organizational Change* and as author applied to military mentoring. ⁴⁸ Items with dual codes reflect comments that fall into more than one subcategory and have been replicated under each section that applies. At times some statements might fit into more than two subcategories, however the author limited each statement to no more than two subcategories. Sentences are paraphrases based on actual data collected from writings.

OA1-GOALS (What is the military trying to achieve? The goal of mentoring is to assist in the transformation of junior officers into future strategic leaders. Goals guide individual's behaviors.)

OA1-The military needs to clarify the desired outcomes of their mentoring program.

OA1-The military needs to clarify the distinction between mentoring and leading: mentoring as one aspect of leadership.

OA1-The military needs to determine mentoring expectations for a junior officer.

OA1-The military needs to make it clear that the goal of mentoring is to set up junior officers for success.

OA1-The military needs to reduce the importance of the quest for a mentor and refocus its emphasis on the fundamentals of leadership.

OA1-The military needs to re-establish the mentoring concept to its original intent.

OA1-The military's goal of mentoring should be to set up the success of their junior officers.

OA1/OA2-Mentoring should have a purpose, method, and desired end-state.

OA1/OA2-Senior officers should establish clear processes, goals, and philosophies that are based on the junior officer's position as well as organization needs.

OA1/OA2-The military needs to establish objectives (outcomes) that can translate into executable tasks. Having established objectives will result in developing an implementation strategy for mentoring.

OA1/OA2-The military needs to modify both the concept of mentoring and its implementation.

OA1/OA2-The military needs to modify both the concept of mentoring and its implementation.

OA1/OA2-The military needs to modify the concept and the implementation of mentoring.

OA1/OA2-The military needs to modify the mentoring concept and its implementation to include the relationship between the mentor and the mentee.

OA1/OA2-The military should modify the concept and the implementation of mentoring to meet the goal of preparing future leaders.

OA1/OA4-The military needs to re-evaluate the definition of mentoring to include the desired outcomes for both the mentor and the protégé,

OA1/OA6-Mentoring needs to establish milestones for achievements that are periodically assessed.

OA1/SF2-Mentoring feedback should be used to further modify doctrine.

OA1/SF2-The mentor cannot work in a vacuum. Junior officers must provide feedback to the mentor in the form of their stated goals and aspirations.

OA1/SF2-The military needs to re-establish mentoring as a special, informal, long-term relationship that is built on mutual respect.

OA1/SF4-The military needs to recognize not everyone is a promising leader.

OA2=STRATEGIES (What are the ways to achieve the military's goal of growing future leaders?)

OA2-After six months of deployment of new definitions, feedback is presented to TRADDOC from senior officers and junior officers as to the usefulness of the new defined roles of mentee.

OA2-Army must modify and clarify its concept of mentoring.

OA2-Fixes to the mentoring program need to be process focused, not product focused.

OA2-Junior officer's needs should be developed jointly on a one-to-one basis and should not be conducted as a group training session.

OA2-Leadership and mentoring terms need to be distinguished from one and other.

OA2-Mentoring can either be professional or be personal.

OA2-Mentoring cannot be exercised in a training event.

OA2-Mentoring in the classical sense does not fit the Army's practical needs.

OA2-Mentoring should be a planned program of optimum learning tailored to the needs of the learner.

OA2-Mentorship is not required nor needed, leadership is.

OA2-Teaching and coaching is an appropriate way for Army to look at mentoring.

OA2-The Army should consider using successful models from industry or other agencies that have developed effective programs.

OA2-The Army should not abandon mentorship: the Army should modify its implementation.

OA2-The Army should promote the development of good leaders not classical mentoring.

OA2-The concept of mentoring should be applied like its use in sport teams.

OA2-The military implementation method needs to be reviewed.

OA2-The military needs a different approach to mentoring.

OA2-The military needs a new concept and a new implementation model for mentoring.

OA2-The military needs to change how we present mentoring to our junior officers early in their career.

OA2-The military needs to clarify the roles of the senior officer and the roles and responsibilities of the junior officers.

OA2-The military needs to define the roles and the responsibilities of its members in the mentoring relationship.

OA2-The military needs to define the roles and the responsibilities of relationship between a mentor and a mentee.

OA2-The military needs to modify the doctrine to reflect the need to have entry-level leaders (second lieutenants and Sergeants) mentored throughout their career by their first senior leader.

OA2-The military needs to modify the implementation of mentoring or eliminate it as a formal leadership requirement.

- OA2-The military needs to modify implementation of mentoring with earlier involvement of junior officers.
- OA2-The military needs to modify the implementation of mentoring.
- OA2-The military should change the implementation rather than reinterpreting or modifying the concept of mentoring.
- OA2-The military should derive time-tested successful practices that could be used to benefit the Army.
- OA2-The military should extract key aspects of mentoring that are beneficial and incorporate them into the leadership process.
- OA2-The military should implement a three-phase approach: first, both mentor and mentee establish rules, goals, walk-through assessment phase and agree to a commitment; second, despite length focuses on the mentee acquiring knowledge, skills and abilities proactively for his or her self-improvement; and third, establishes a post-development and termination phase.
- OA2-The military should implement an integrated formalized program that is flexible, tailored to Army and its officer's corps over time.
- OA2-The military should modify the concept of mentoring.
- OA2-The military should modify the concept of mentoring.
- OA2-The military should modify the concept of mentoring.
- OA2-The military should place equal emphasis on senior officers and junior officers responsibilities for mentoring.
- OA2-The military should publish suggestions rather than mandates.
- OA2-The senior officer should establish the requirement for the junior officer's participation and management of the mentoring relationship.
- OA2-The senior officer should only have to verify that the junior officer has a written mentorship program and not be responsible to mentor all his or her junior officers.
- OA2/OA1-Mentoring should have a purpose, method, and desired end-state.
- OA2/OA1-Senior officers should establish clear processes, goals, and philosophies that are based on the junior officer's position as well as organization needs.
- OA2/OA1-The military needs to establish objectives (outcomes) that can translate into executable tasks. Having established objectives will result in developing an implementation strategy for mentoring.
- OA2/OA1-The military needs to modify both the concept of mentoring and its implementation.
- OA2/OA1-The military needs to modify both the concept of mentoring and its implementation.
- OA2/OA1-The military needs to modify the concept and the implementation of mentoring.
- OA2/OA1-The military needs to modify the mentoring concept and its implementation to include the relationship between the mentor and the mentee.
- OA2/OA1-The military should modify the concept and the implementation of mentoring to meet the goal of preparing future leaders.
- OA2/OA4-Doctrine is not needed: teaching junior officer's role in mentoring is senior officer's responsibility.
- OA2/OA4-The Army should develop broad guidelines rather than use a cookbook method for mentoring.

OA2/OA4-The military needs to define: what a mentor is, what a mentor does, and what responsibilities does the mentee have in the relationship.

OA2/OA4-The military needs to develop an informal instruction on classical mentoring that defines the roles of both mentor and mentee.

OA2/OA4-The military should allow anyone to be a mentor or to seek a mentor.

OA2/OA4-The military should de-emphasize the terms mentor and mentoring and link to fundamentals of leadership.

OA2/OA4-The military should implement Coast Guard like program that uses a voluntary website to initiative relationships. The program attempts to marry mentor to mentee through use of inputs from voluntary mentors and voluntary mentee. The mentee is provided a list of potential mentors that match their interests. The mentee may call or e-mail any potential mentor on the list. The junior officer's senior officer is also notified whenever a mentoring relationship is created.

OA2/OA4-The military should modify the current concept of mentoring as defined in doctrine.

OA2/OA4-The military's doctrine and mentoring implementation needs modification.
OA2/OA4-The original concept of mentoring must be modified and redefined to meet Army's needs.

OA2/OA6-The military needs to focus limited resources on soldiers with the greatest over all potential or greatest potential for improvement.

OA2/OA6-The military needs to transform leadership to a primary thrust of mentorship and make it a block on the yearly performance report. Each officer would be graded on their efforts to develop leaders.

OA2/SF1-The emphasis of mentoring should focus on individual and not on mentoring everyone equally.

OA2/SF1-The junior officers should be offered the opportunity to gain an external, nonthreatening source of wisdom and advise.

OA2/SF1-The military should respect the motive for selection of mentors by junior officers in a mentoring relationship.

OA2/SF2-Mentoring relationships should not be forced but should be voluntary: mentor and mentee choosing each other based somewhat on chemistry.

OA2/SF2-Senior leaders retain responsibility that junior officers have mentors, but not be responsible for the establishment of the mentoring relationship.

OA2/SF2-The Army should change the way a senior officer implements the program with more dialogue, not with new doctrine.

OA2/SF2-The military needs to devise a game plan with a feedback mechanism that is mutually agreed upon approach.

OA2/SF2-The military should create a series of local programs like "big brother, big sister" partnerships. Both the senior officer and the junior officer could enroll and then be paired with hopes of an enduring match.

OA2/SF2-The military should modify the concept of mentoring. While every junior officer will be mentored, not every junior officer will develop enduring relationships that result in long-term benefits.

OA2/SF2-The military should modify the implementation concept by expanding dialogue between junior officer and senior officer.

OA2/SF2-The military should reexamine the concept of mentorship and clarify the roles and responsibilities of junior officer's have in a mentoring relationship.

OA2/SF2-The military should use the historic concept of mentoring to create enduring relationships.

OA2/SF2-The senior officer must select a few junior officers who over the years could best progress while involved in two-way mentoring relationship.

OA2/SF3-Our role as mentors is to identify those who we see potential for future positions of greater responsibility and grow them through the way we assign them, challenge them, coach them and counsel them. This is a relationship that should last beyond an assignment.

OA2/SF3-The "long-term" commitment should be redefined in terms of possibly three to five years.

OA2/SF3-The junior officer should be allowed to select mentors, rather than leaders selecting those that show promise.

OA2/SF3-The military should explain the concept of mentoring but not imply every officer gets assigned a mentor or that it is his or her own commander who establishes the relationship.

OA2/SF4-The members of the military should identify mentors for each level. Feedback should be used to confirm or reject self-assessments, identify other weaknesses and strengths. Then members should develop action plans to overcome weaknesses.

OA2/SF4-The military members should conduct a self-evaluation to look at his or her strengths and weaknesses.

OA2/SF4-The military should model Tichy's leadership engine. Chief executive officer, Jack Welsh, created an environment where job number one is developing future leaders. Senior officers need to create an organization's ideas, values, and vision and establish a culture that promotes teachable points of view that can be clearly articulated.

OA2/TF3-The formal mentoring program must be voluntary but also structured.

OA2/TF4-The Army needs to develop clearly defined roles for the mentee in doctrine, by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADDOC), and once developed distributed to the field rapidly.

OA2/TF4-The military should develop a concept of a mentoring team rather than an individual mentor.

OA2/TF5-The military needs to develop training packages using pre-established basic and advanced training programs to change the scope of responsibilities and obligations for both leader and subordinate (both military and its civilians).

AO3=FORMAL STRUCTURE (Organizational chart that defines the formal flows of communication. In this case how does the organizational structure support mentoring?)

OA3-The military needs to take mentoring out of the chain-of-command.

OA3-The military should adopt that senior cadets mentor junior cadets and Professors of Military Science could mentor senior cadets in non-threatening environments.

OA3/SF3-It is key to effective mentoring that the junior officer can seek advice and counsel without the fear of recrimination. This is hard to accomplish within one's chain-of-command. OA3/SF3-The military needs to focus selection of mentors so that he or she is of low threat to the junior officer and cannot be in his or her immediate chain-of-command.

OA3/SF4-Mentors should serve as advisors, a master of his or her fate, someone who can provide guidance and is not threatened by another's ability to achieve greatness.

OA4=ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (These are the formal rules that define the ways of mentoring.)

OA4-Eliminate the term mentoring as currently defined in doctrine, call it coaching, call it supervision, but do not call it mentoring in the classical sense.

OA4-Revise Army's doctrine and policy by replacing the mentoring term with "performance and career counseling."

OA4-The Army doctrine should abandon the term mentoring rather than try to reshape the term.

OA4-The Army's proper term is not mentoring but should be called "performance, career counseling, and leadership."

OA4-The concept of mentoring needs modification in Army's doctrine.

OA4-The leaders should fulfill their role as defined in Field Manual 22-100 and eliminate the term mentor.

OA4-The military doctrine on mentoring needs revision.

OA4-The military needs to define mentoring expectations for junior officers and senior officers.

OA4-The military needs to define mentorship more clearly.

OA4-The military should change the word "counseling" to "mentoring," counseling has a negative connotation to the term.

OA4-The military should not mandate mentoring.

OA4-The military should update mentoring doctrine to detail the requirements of senior officer duties and also detail the responsibilities of junior officers.

OA4-The military should utilize the proper terminology for mentoring.

OA4-The military's doctrine described as mentoring is better suited under general leadership.

OA4-The military's doctrine should take into consideration real-world distractions that could contribute to ineffectiveness of mentoring.

OA4/OA1-The military needs to re-evaluate the definition of mentoring to include the desired outcomes for both the mentor and the protégé,

OA4/OA2-Doctrine is not needed: teaching junior officer's role in mentoring is senior officer's responsibility.

OA4/OA2-The Army should develop broad guidelines rather than use a cookbook method for mentoring.

OA4/OA2-The military needs to define: what a mentor is, what a mentor does, and what responsibilities does the mentee have in the relationship.

OA4/OA2-The military needs to develop an informal instruction on classical mentoring that defines the roles of both mentor and mentee.

OA4/OA2-The military should allow anyone to be a mentor or to seek a mentor.

OA4/OA2-The military should de-emphasize the terms mentor and mentoring and link to fundamentals of leadership.

OA4/OA2-The military should implement Coast Guard like program that uses a voluntary website to initiative relationships. The program attempts to marry mentor to mentee through use of inputs from voluntary mentors and voluntary mentee. The mentee is provided a list of potential mentors that match their interests. The mentee may call or e-mail any potential mentor on the list. The junior officer's senior officer is also notified whenever a mentoring relationship is created.

OA4/OA2-The military should modify the current concept of mentoring as defined in doctrine.

OA4/OA2-The military's doctrine and mentoring implementation needs modification.

OA4/OA2-The original concept of mentoring must be modified and redefined to meet Army's needs.

OA4/SF2-Mentoring could be defined as a teacher-student friendship fostered between two people for the purpose of developing leadership within an organization.

OA4/SF2-Mentoring feedback should be used to further modify doctrine.

OA4/SF2-Mentoring relationships cannot be manufactured or assigned; they grow when conditions are right.

OA4/SF2-The mentor and protégé should develop a mentoring contract, establish trust, and achieve confidence between the leader and his or her subordinate.

OA4/SF2-The mentoring agreement must exist between mentor and mentee, regardless of whether it is formally or informally established.

OA4/SF2-The military should modify senior leader's requirement to mentor all junior officers currently under his or her influence to a more long-term relationship.

OA4/SF2-The military's doctrine must require open dialogue and discussion to create a contract that defines the junior officer's needs professionally, educationally and personally.

OA4/SF3-However, mentoring relationships occur intuitively by those who desire it and do not really require doctrine.

OA4/SF3-The military doctrine must clearly define the mentor's and the mentee's relationship in order to eliminate false expectations.

OA4/SF3-The military needs to accept that mentoring occurs between a limited number of master and pupil pairs.

OA4/SF3-The senior officer must have distinctly different requirements for each junior officer based on his or her strengths and weaknesses. Doctrine cannot capture this.

OA4/SF4-Manuals do not create a mentorship atmosphere: the senior officer creates the mentorship atmosphere.

OA4/SF4-The military doctrine needs to instruct on what to look for and to expect for input from leaders (when, how, and where).

OA4/SF4-The military's doctrine should state that mentoring is not a free ride; it takes work on part of the junior officer.

OA4/TF2-The Army needs to modify its publications and training for mentoring.

OA4/TF2-The doctrine should define who should be a mentor, who the mentee ought to be and provide a reasonable number of mentees to the mentor.

OA4/TF2-The military should modify implementation of mentoring into a coherent formalized program that includes training as part of officer's curriculum.

OA5=ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS (Formally established systems that support coordination in the military organization such as the financial, informational, and personnel management systems.

OA6=REWARD SYSTEM (An administrative system that has direct impact on the behaviors of individuals by designing reward systems that support mentoring such as pay, benefits, bonus, non-monetary rewards, and evaluation systems.)

OA6-For mentoring to be successful the military must establish as reward mechanism such as continuous reinforcement of the value of mentoring to service members.

OA6-Rewards for high performance should be vested in jobs with significant responsibility.

OA6-The benefits of mentoring can be reaped by cooperatively developing junior officers.

OA6-The military must change promotion practices if mentoring is to matter. People are assigned to mentors based on Army's needs not their personal development.

OA6-The military needs to establish a no retribution policy for either party participating in mentoring relationships.

OA6-The military needs to focus on the benefits of multiple mentors.

OA6-The military needs to make mentoring an integral part of the rating and the evaluation process.

OA6/OA1-Mentoring needs to establish milestones for achievements that are periodically assessed.

OA6/OA2-The military needs to focus limited resources on soldiers with the greatest over all potential or greatest potential for improvement.

OA6/OA2-The military needs to transform leadership to a primary thrust of mentorship and make it a block on the yearly performance report. Each officer would be graded on their efforts to develop leaders.

OA6/SF1-All junior officers should be counseled and coached but not to the same extent as one with great promise.

OA6/SF1-Mentoring should not be considered a failure if soldiers decide to leave the military. Soldiers who leave the Army better than when they started are not failures. They have potential energy to become proactive citizens

OA6/SF2-Both parties need to have realistic expectations of benefits and energy expended for mentoring relationships.

OA6/SF2-Mentoring needs to establish a feedback mechanism that includes periodic reviews of progress to meet the military's objectives.

- SF1=CULTURE (Culture is described by many terms some of which are artifacts, basic assumptions, beliefs, collective will, core values, ideologies norms, and philosophies. An emotional level feeling about the military profession and leadership that influences mentoring's effectiveness.)
- SF1-Army needs to convey that it is totally acceptable not to have a mentor, especially for junior officers prior to company command. It is not until after command that a junior officer will need guidance on their career choices.
- SF1-Culture needs to reestablish that mentoring is good. Current negative connotations exist for mentoring such as riding on the coat tails of the mentor or the mentor as a godfather of the mentee.
- SF1-Mentoring needs to be recognized by junior officers as one of many paths to senior leadership.
- SF1-Mentoring should not be considered favoritism; favoritism brings death to morale.
- SF1-The military needs to correct junior officers who have been mislead to believe all mentoring results in long-term relationships.
- SF1-The military needs to create a true expectation for its junior officers that all will be mentored but only a few relationships will grow into enduring ones.
- SF1-The military needs to eliminate the current concept that everyone must have a mentor.
- SF1-The military needs to work to remove the negative labels associated with mentoring.
- SF1-The military should modify the expectations of mentoring from those currently viewed.
- SF1-When a junior officer asks for help, it should not be seen as a weakness.
- SF1/OA2-The emphasis of mentoring should focus on individual and not on mentoring everyone equally.
- SF1/OA2-The junior officers should be offered the opportunity to gain an external, non-threatening source of wisdom and advise.
- SF1/OA2-The military should respect the motive for selection of mentors by junior officers in a mentoring relationship.
- SF1/OA6-All junior officers should be counseled and coached but not to the same extent as one with great promise.
- SF1/OA6-Mentoring should not be considered a failure if soldiers decide to leave the military. Soldiers who leave the Army better than when they started are not failures. They have potential energy to become proactive citizens
- SF1/SF2-Leaders should spend as much time with "funny looking kids" as with their star pupils.
- SF1/SF2-The military needs to instill the true spirit and intent of mentoring for both the junior officer and senior officer. The senior officer must respect the junior officer and voluntarily take a personal interest in the junior officer. Junior officers and senior officers must be dedicated and willing participants. The junior officer must learn to accept teachings, tolerate criticism and apply to his or her life to benefit from mentoring.
- SF1/SF3-The military needs to make it common knowledge that effort equates to relationships that endure.
- SF1/TF2-Leaders must become students as well as teachers to affect lasting cultural change.

- SF2=INTERACTION PROCESSES (Interaction processes include interpersonal, group, and intergroup where human interactions take place within an organization.
- SF2-Active learning allows the protégé to evaluate what is valuable to the individual and what is not. This process allows junior officers to understand themselves better. It helps to identify the junior officer's motivations, strengths, weaknesses, desires and aspirations.
- SF2-If a pairing between senior officer and junior officer does not work well, the junior officer should simply try again without concern for long-term affects that might develop between the leader and his or her subordinate.
- SF2-Lasting relationships are built on mutual interest of both the junior officer and the senior officer.
- SF2-Mentoring is a two-way street. Mentors are expected to provide the time needed to prepare a junior officer for success.
- SF2-Mentoring is two-way learning experience.
- SF2-Mentoring must be a two-way street with a common basis to grow into a developmental relationship.
- SF2-Mentoring needs to focus on junior officer interests in learning, not just in what junior officer needs to know.
- SF2-Mentoring pairs that work out remained matched after reassignment by keeping in touch through modern communication systems.
- SF2-Mentoring relationships must be two-way.
- SF2-Mentoring relationships need time to build trust.
- SF2-Mentoring should provide advice that is both wanted and offered willingly by both parties.
- SF2-Mentors must encourage constant communication. The mentor often leaves the flow of information from the junior officer to senior officer but that doesn't benefit the mentor or the mentee.
- SF2-The junior officer has the responsibility for maintaining the relationship over time to seek wisdom, to seek advice and to seek guidance.
- SF2-The junior officer should be able to identify a mentor, either by informal assignment or by formal assignment.
- SF2-The junior officer should select a mentor and respect should be a key motive in their choice of a mentor.
- SF2-The junior officer's input into the process needs to be valued to build a positive mentoring relationship of mutual respect.
- SF2-The mentor and the protégé should mutually define their expectations.
- SF2-The mentoring relationships need development.
- SF2-The military needs to recognize the importance of peer mentorship.
- SF2-The military needs to develop the concept of mentoring as a mutual supporting relationship between both mentor and mentee.
- SF2-The military needs to recommend mentoring feedback from protégé to mentor.
- SF2-The military should allow natural gravitation of mentoring relationships that have more chance to develop into long-term relationships.
- SF2-The military's doctrine must reflect the need for mutual contributions from both the mentor and the protégé. Mentoring is a shared experience and an interactive relationship.
- SF2/OA1-Mentoring feedback should be used to further modify doctrine.

SF2/OA1-The mentor cannot work in a vacuum. Junior officers must provide feedback to the mentor in the form of their stated goals and aspirations.

SF2/OA1-The military needs to re-establish mentoring as a special, informal, long-term relationship that is built on mutual respect.

SF2/OA2-Mentoring relationships should not be forced but should be voluntary: mentor and mentee choosing each other based somewhat on chemistry.

SF2/OA2-Senior leaders retain responsibility that junior officers have mentors, but not be responsible for the establishment of the mentoring relationship.

SF2/OA2-The Army should change the way a senior officer implements the program with more dialogue, not with new doctrine.

SF2/OA2-The military needs to devise a game plan with a feedback mechanism that is mutually agreed upon approach.

SF2/OA2-The military should create a series of local programs like "big brother, big sister" partnerships. Both the senior officer and the junior officer could enroll and then be paired with hopes of an enduring match.

SF2/OA2-The military should modify the concept of mentoring. While every junior officer will be mentored, not every junior officer will develop enduring relationships that result in long-term benefits.

SF2/OA2-The military should modify the implementation concept by expanding dialogue between junior officer and senior officer.

SF2/OA2-The military should reexamine the concept of mentorship and clarify the roles and responsibilities of junior officer's have in a mentoring relationship.

SF2/OA2-The military should use the historic concept of mentoring to create enduring relationships.

SF2/OA2-The senior officer must select a few junior officers who over the years could best progress while involved in two-way mentoring relationship.

SF2/OA4-Mentoring could be defined as a teacher-student friendship fostered between two people for the purpose of developing leadership within an organization.

SF2/OA4-Mentoring feedback should be used to further modify doctrine.

SF2/OA4-Mentoring relationships cannot be manufactured or assigned; they grow when conditions are right.

SF2/OA4-The mentor and protégé should develop a mentoring contract, establish trust, and achieve confidence between the leader and his or her subordinate.

SF2/OA4-The mentoring agreement must exist between mentor and mentee, regardless of whether it is formally or informally established.

SF2/OA4-The military should modify senior leader's requirement to mentor all junior officers currently under his or her influence to a more long-term relationship.

SF2/OA4-The military's doctrine must require open dialogue and discussion to create a contract that defines the junior officer's needs professionally, educationally and personally.

SF2/OA6-Both parties need to have realistic expectations of benefits and energy expended for mentoring relationships.

SF2/OA6-Mentoring needs to establish a feedback mechanism that includes periodic reviews of progress to meet the military's objectives.

SF2/SF1-Leaders should spend as much time with "funny looking kids" as with their star pupils.

SF2/SF1-The military needs to instill the true spirit and intent of mentoring for both the junior officer and senior officer. The senior officer must respect junior officer and voluntarily take a personal interest in the junior officer. Junior officers and senior officers must be dedicated and willing participants. The junior officer must learn to accept teachings, tolerate criticism and apply to his or her life to benefit from mentoring.

SF2/SF3-Contract between mentor and protégé should incorporate staying in touch once they have separated to share new lessons learned.

SF2/SF3-Not all mentoring relationships will be enduring: these relationships occur only when the junior officer and senior officer create that type of bond together.

SF2/SF4-Miltary members should seek advice at all levels, as wisdom is gained through this experience.

SF2/SF4-The junior officer must invest heavily in aspects of high performance required to be selected as a mentee and must continue his or her high performance throughout their career to continue the relationship.

SF2/SF4-The junior officer must take an active role, be open to knowledge and skills passed down by his or her mentor. The junior officer must be proactive in requesting help where they need development. Junior officers who seek mentoring should seek specific areas of growth and test their understanding under his or her mentor's tutelage.

SF2/SF4-The senior officer must have the moral courage to be frank and honest with junior officers and their peers.

SF2/SF4-The senior officer needs to identify exceptional junior officers and form a strong lasting bond that stands the test of time and relocations.

SF2/TF2-In junior officer education we need to focus on how to work to a person's full potential and the use of feedback mechanisms as a means to grow and improve.

SF2/TF2-Mentoring relationships should be made to last until requisite skills are acquired.

SF2/TF2-The mentee must be able to differentiate the good traits from bad traits in their mentors and be able to incorporate only the good ones.

SF2/TF2-The military should teach junior officers to take a proactive approach; mentoring is a shared relationship. You get out of it what you put into it.

SF2/TF2-The senior officer needs to provide time, counseling, and guidance, and must be honest with his or her protégé. The senior officer helps to develop options to help the junior officer face professional and personal decisions.

SF2/TF3-Mentoring should be designed to increase dialogue between a senior officer and a junior officer.

SF3=SOCIAL PATTERNS AND NETWORKS (An informally established method of getting things done that deviates from how things are suppose to be done. From those members who have had experience with mentoring relationships, how does mentoring really happen?)

SF3-All military members need the right leadership, not all members need or require mentorship.

- SF3-Mentees should be evaluated on how active they are in their own development and must know this from the beginning.
- SF3-Mentoring commitments should be provided to junior officers who show promise and have a desire to excel. This should not be a program for all.
- SF3-Mentoring is a method of informing.
- SF3-Mentoring requires incorporation of trust, understanding and mutual respect between mentor and mentee.
- SF3-The junior officer has the responsibility to maintain a relationship with the senior officer in today's fast paced society. This will not be easy.
- SF3-The junior officers and senior officers must establish and maintain solid communications. Learning is stopped if open communication fails to occur.
- SF3-The mentee must incorporate the good traits of the mentor and pass them onto their subordinates.
- SF3-The military members have a responsibility to seek out and demand periodic feedback from not only superiors, but from peers and subordinates as well.
- SF3-The military needs to encourage junior officers to seek mentors whenever practical and to insist that the senior officer will fulfill his or her role in growing future leaders.
- SF3-The military needs to make mentoring more adaptable to the Army's environment.
- SF3-The military needs to recognize that leadership styles vary and knowledge can be acquired by junior officers in not only what to do but also what not to do.
- SF3-The military needs to solicit feedback to improve mentoring.
- SF3-The military should create a forum to discuss the roles of the mentee in the process.
- SF3/OA2-Our role as mentors is to identify those who we see potential for future positions of greater responsibility and grow them through the way we assign them, challenge them, coach them and counsel them. This is a relationship that should last beyond an assignment.
- SF3/OA2-The "I\long-term" commitment should be redefined in terms of possibly three to five years.
- SF3/OA2-The junior officer should be allowed to select mentors, rather than leaders selecting those that show promise.
- SF3/OA3-It is key to effective mentoring that the junior officer can seek advice and counsel without the fear of recrimination. This is hard to accomplish within one's chain-of-command.
- SF3/OA3-The military needs to focus selection of mentors so that he or she is of low threat to the junior officer and cannot be in his or her immediate chain-of-command.
- SF3/OA4-However, mentoring relationships occur intuitively by those who desire it and do not really require doctrine.
- SF3/OA4-The military doctrine must clearly define the mentor's and the mentee's relationship in order to eliminate false expectations.
- SF3/OA4-The military needs to accept that mentoring occurs between a limited number of master and pupil pairs.
- SF3/OA4-The senior officer must have distinctly different requirements for each junior officer based on his or her strengths and weaknesses. Doctrine cannot capture this.

SF3/SF1-The military needs to make it common knowledge that effort equates to relationships that endure.

SF3/SF2-Contract between mentor and protégé should incorporate staying in touch once they have separated to share new lessons learned.

SF3/SF2-Not all mentoring relationships will be enduring: these relationships occur only when the junior officer and senior officer create that type of bond together.

SF3/SF4-The senior officer needs to acknowledge the generational gap that exists between the senior officer and the junior officers of today.

SF3/TF2-Given the time constraints and limited availability of senior officers, the junior officers not interested in mentoring will be mentored to a point allowing those who really seek the relationships to obtain them.

SF4=INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES (These are the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that an individual brings into the organization and develops as a member of the organization. How do they feel about the military profession, how do they feel about mentoring and how do they feel about the people in the military?)

SF4-As senior officers our hearts must have space to be concerned about the development of junior officers.

SF4-Formal mentoring must be reserved for those who seek out such a relationship.

SF4-Junior officers do not care how much you know, until they know how much you care. Be a good mentor to someone today.

SF4-Key element for effective mentoring is the junior officer's willingness and desire for mentorship.

SF4-Leaders must first understand themselves, their weaknesses and how to improve their performance. This requires both self-assessment and feedback from superiors, peers, and subordinates. Leader's moral duty is to be honest with himself or herself. Leaders must have the moral courage to listen to the cons about himself or herself in order to be effective mentors.

SF4-Leaders who cannot or will not mentor need to find other employment.

SF4-Mentoring is relaying both professional and personal experiences to the protégé.

SF4-Relationships must be built in an environment that is honest and truthful. The senior officer must build a positive environment where mentoring will flourish.

SF4-Senior leaders establish tone for an open communicative environment.

SF4-Senior leaders need to develop the desire to teach and mutual learning becomes the key to successful mentorship.

SF4-Senior officers should create dialogue with protégé rather than dictate.

SF4-The junior officer must be willing to seek assistance.

SF4-The junior officer must keep faith with their mentors at all times.

SF4-The junior officer must take interest in his or her own development.

SF4-The mentee must desire, with fire of will, to succeed in the profession and must allow time to develop lasting relationships.

SF4-The military needs straightforward and proactive leadership. A commander is someone who sets the standard daily and communicates it by doing it.

SF4-The military needs to recognize that junior officers need to control his or her own

destinies.

SF4-The senior officer must practice active listening skills and critical thinking.

SF4-The senior officer needs to develop the atmosphere for the relationship to develop.

SF4-The senior officer needs to take an active and permanent role in educating future leaders.

SF4-The senior officer should have sole responsibility, set the tone for interest and for contribution to junior officer's development.

SF4-The senior officer should spend more time listening to a junior officer than speaking.

SF4-The success of mentoring should not rely on the personalities of senior officer.

SF4/OA1-The military needs to recognize not everyone is a promising leader.

SF4/OA2-The members of the military should identify mentors for each level. Feedback should be used to confirm or reject self-assessments, identify other weaknesses and strengths. Then members should develop action plans to overcome weaknesses.

SF4/OA2-The military members should conduct a self-evaluation to look at his or her strengths and weaknesses.

SF4/OA2-The military should model Tichy's leadership engine. Chief executive officer, Jack Welsh, created an environment where job number one is developing future leaders. Senior officers need to create an organization's ideas, values, and vision and establish a culture that promotes teachable points of view that can be clearly articulated.

SF4/OA3-Mentors should serve as advisors, a master of his or her fate, someone who can provide guidance and is not threatened by another's ability to achieve greatness.

SF4/OA4-Manuals do not create a mentorship atmosphere: the senior officer creates the mentorship atmosphere.

SF4/OA4-The military doctrine needs to instruct on what to look for and to expect for input from leaders (when, how, and where).

SF4/OA4-The military's doctrine should state that mentoring is not a free ride; it takes work on part of the junior officer.

SF4/SF2-Miltary members should seek advice at all levels, as wisdom is gained through this experience.

SF4/SF2-The junior officer must take an active role, be open to knowledge and skills passed down by his or her mentor. The junior officer must be proactive in requesting help where they need development. Junior officers who seek mentoring should seek specific areas of growth and test their understanding under his or her mentor's tutelage.

SF4/SF2-The senior officer needs to identify exceptional junior officers and form a strong lasting bond that stands the test of time and relocations.

SF4/SF2-The junior officer must invest heavily in aspects of high performance required to be selected as a mentee and must continue his or her high performance throughout their career to continue the relationship.

SF4/SF2-The senior officer must have the moral courage to be frank and honest with junior officers and their peers.

SF4/SF3-The senior officer needs to acknowledge the generational gap that exists between the senior officer and the junior officers of today.

SF4/TF2-The protégé needs to know his or her responsibility for questioning, for challenging, for testing and for applying the lessons learned from the mentor.

SF4/TF6-Success cannot be measured in having a mentoring relationship. Success will come to those individuals with the desire to do so whether or not he or she is mentored.

TECHNOLOGY FACTORS

TF1=TOOLS, EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY (The materials used to transform junior officers to leaders.)

TF2=TECHNICAL EXPERTISE (Technical expertise refers to the technical knowledge and physical skills an individual has to accomplish the organization's tasks. The knowledge, skills and abilities a mentor must have in order to be successful in the transferring of those abilities and skills to his or her protégé.)

TF2-Developmental interpersonal phases of mentoring need to be explored insuring that the junior officer feels that he or she is being mentored not just counseled.

TF2-It is important for the military to time training initially during pre-commissioning at West Point, at ROTC, and at Officer Candidate schools. New cadets could play roles of both mentor and mentee. After which training should continue and include practical exercises at Officer's Basic Course, during classroom instruction, and utilize role-playing (Lieutenant's capstone exercise).

TF2-Junior officers need to be trained in developing goals and aspirations.

TF2-Mentoring is often accomplished but untrained members may not be aware that it has happened. All critiques and reviews are a form of mentoring which role is to develop leaders.

TF2-Military members must understand that learning is a life-long process.

TF2-Nature of mentorship should shift from initial introduction on how to mentor to how to be an effective mentor during tenure at war colleges.

TF2-Senior leaders need to develop confidence by training others. They must focus their efforts on knowledge and abilities transfer and less on skill transfer. Some junior officers have better skills than their senior officers.

TF2-Senior officers have to be trained on mentoring in better ways then what has failed in the past. Develop training aids and models to fit the military's needs.

TF2-Senior officers need to be trained to be mentors.

TF2-The Army should educate its junior officers that mentoring is a mutual experience if it is to last.

TF2-The Army's goal should be to educate junior officers on how to effectively implement leadership traits that will work for them.

TF2-The military needs to create a new training campaign for mentoring using the concept of mentoring is a team of two slogan.

TF2-The military needs to create training for junior leaders on mentoring.

TF2-The military needs to develop core training materials to adopt Army-wide.

TF2-The military needs to educate junior officers to accept and utilize short-term

TECHNOLOGY FACTORS

mentorship.

- TF2-The military needs to encourage informal mentoring in leadership training classes, in symposiums and in collegial discourse.
- TF2-The military needs to help members develop an understanding of mentoring.
- TF2-The military needs to improve early education and training on mentoring.
- TF2-The military needs to teach junior officers how to be mentored. How to develop relationships built on mutual respect and how to recognize competence and credibility in the mentors. In addition the mentor needs to be taught how to develop the potential and capability of those they mentor.
- TF2-The military needs to train its members that mentoring is a continuous process.
- TF2-The military should encourage life-long learning not mentoring.
- TF2-The military should initiate training at boot camp that learning is the focus of mentorship.
- TF2-The military should use education to teach members what needs to be taught from both sides (mentor and protégé) about mentoring.
- TF2-Use Army schools to teach responsibilities and expectations for mentoring to junior officers through practical exercises and role-playing.
- TF2/OA4-The Army needs to modify its publications and training for mentoring.
- TF2/OA4-The doctrine should define who should be a mentor, who the mentee ought to be and provide a reasonable number of mentees to the mentor.
- TF2/OA4-The military should modify implementation of mentoring into a coherent formalized program that includes training as part of officer's curriculum.
- TF2/SF1-Leaders must become students as well as teachers to affect lasting cultural change.
- TF2/SF2-In junior officer education we need to focus on how to work to a person's full potential and the use of feedback mechanisms as a means to grow and improve.
- TF2/SF2-Mentoring relationships should be made to last until requisite skills are acquired.
- TF2/SF2-The mentee must be able to differentiate the good traits from bad traits in their mentors and be able to incorporate only the good ones.
- TF2/SF2-The military should teach junior officers to take a proactive approach; mentoring is a shared relationship. You get out of it what you put into it.
- TF2/SF2-The senior officer needs to provide time, counseling, and guidance, and must be honest with his or her protégé. The senior officer helps to develop options to help the junior officer face professional and personal decisions.
- TF2/SF3-Given the time constraints and limited availability of senior officers, the junior officers not interested in mentoring will be mentored to a point allowing those who really seek the relationships to obtain them.
- TF2/SF4-The protégé needs to know his or her responsibility for questioning, for challenging, for testing and for applying the lessons learned from the mentor.

TECHNOLOGY FACTORS

TF3=JOB DESIGN (The placing of a series of tasks in a certain order that facilitates the accomplishment of a job. In this case a mentor's job could be considered the transfer of a particular skill that is the foundation of acquiring other skills. A mentor's job might include improving protégé's communication skills. One task in improving the protégé's communication skills might include proofreading the protégé's products and providing feedback.)

TF3-Emphasize teaching mentoring as a continuous process and that everyone needs to learn how to improve.

TF3/OA2-The formal mentoring program must be voluntary but also structured.

TF3/SF2-Mentoring should be designed to increase dialogue between a senior officer and a junior officer.

TF4=WORK FLOW DESIGN (Jobs are grouped together to create a flow of work that results in an end product. The end product is to transform the junior officer into a strategic leader. Is the flow of skills conducive of creating strategic leaders?)

2T4-Leaders must be made to understand the importance of making quality time for junior officers,

2T4-Senior officers need to make time for the mentoring process.

TF4/OA2-The Army needs to develop clearly defined roles for the mentee in doctrine, by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADDOC), and once developed distributed to the field rapidly.

TF4/OA2-The military should develop a concept of a mentoring team rather than an individual mentor.

TF5=TECHNICAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (These policies are directly related to the outcomes and are not general in scope like those listed under organizing arrangements. What are the specific technical requirements of mentoring?)

TF5/OA2-The military needs to develop training packages using pre-established basic and advanced training programs to change the scope of responsibilities and obligations for both leader and subordinate (both military and its civilians).

TF6=TECHNICAL SYSTEMS (These systems provide information about the state of the transformation process. When does the mentor and the protégé feel that the skills transfers have occurred and has prepared the junior officer to be a strategic leader.)
TF6-Measurement systems should focus on attitude, interpersonal skills and intellectual growth.

TF6-Studies show that people learn best when they are involved, when they feel part of the process, and can expect action based on the lesson.

TF6-Use the understanding of doctrine and the enforcement of doctrine and apply it to mentorship as a means to hold your mentor accountable.

TF6/SF4-Success cannot be measured in having a mentoring relationship. Success will come to those individuals with the desire to do so whether or not he or she is mentored.

TECHNOLOGY FACTORS

PHYSICAL SETTINGS

PS1=SPACE CONFIGURATION (Physical restrictions that limit or channel what a person can do such as how easy it is to communicate.)

PS2=PHYSICAL AMBIANCE (Can be considered physical comfort levels such as lighting, noise, cleanliness, and air quality. Do both the protégé and the mentor feel comfortable in the meeting place?)

PS3=INTERIOR DESIGN (Describes the furniture, decorations, windows, floor coverings and colors. Does the setting make the protégé feel at ease?)

PS4=ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN (The design relates to the overall building design and the perceptions one may attribute to the military profession based on the architecture.)

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Steven W. Hays, "Mentoring," in <u>The Center For Creative Leadership Handbook of Leadership Development</u>, ed. Cynthia D. McCauley, Russ S. Moxley and Ellen Van Velsor (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998), 308.
- ² Chip R. Bell, <u>Managers as Mentors: Building Partnerships for Learning</u> (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1998). Bell views mentoring as a learning partnership.
 - ³ Ibid., xii.
- ⁴ Gary Yukl, <u>Leadership in Organizations</u>, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), 480-1. The following studies were referred to in the Mentoring subsection in Chapter 18 on "Developing leadership skills," as findings that showed positive career affects of mentoring: Choa, Waltz, and Gardener, 1992; Dreher and Ash, 1990; Fegenson, 1989; Scandura, 1992; Turban & Dougherty, 1994; Whitley & Coestsier; 1993.
- ⁵ W. B. Johnson et.al., "Does Mentoring Foster Success?" <u>Proceedings</u> 125 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, Dec 1999): 44-46.
 - ⁶ "General Says Mentoring Would Help Retention," <u>Airman</u> 43 (Washington: Feb 1999).
- ⁷ Lon E. Maggart, and Jeanette S. James, "Mentoring—a Critical Element in Leader Development," <u>Military Review</u> 79 (May/Jun 1999): 86-87 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest, Bell & Howell; accessed on 21 August 2001.
 - ⁸ Webster's College Dictionary (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 829-830.
- ⁹ Department of the Army, <u>Army Leadership: Be. Know, Do</u> Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Department of Army, 31 July 1990), 5-16.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid., 5-18.
- ¹¹ Jerry I. Porras, <u>Stream Analysis: A Powerful Way to Diagnose and Manage</u> Organizational <u>Change</u> (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1987).
 - ¹² Army Leadership: Be, Know Do.
- ¹³ Gareth Morgan, <u>Images of Organization</u>, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997).
- ¹⁴ Peter M. Senge, <u>The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization</u> (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994).
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., 44.
- ¹⁶ James R. Davis and Adelaide B. Davis, <u>Effective Training Strategies: A Comprehensive Guide to Maximizing Learning in Organizations</u>, "The Holistic Strategies" (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. San Francisco, 1998).

- ¹⁷ Michael I. Harrison and Arie Shirom, <u>Organizational Diagnosis and Assessment: Bridging Theory and Practice</u> (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999).
- ¹⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies. American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2000), XVIII. The report surveyed 12,500 men and women in operational units and selected headquarters
 - ¹⁹ Ibid., XXI
 - ²⁰ Porras.
 - ²¹ Ibid., 6.
- ²² General Richard G. Trefry, "Soldiers as Warriors, Warriors as Soldiers" in <u>Joint</u> Processes and <u>Land Power Development</u> 1(Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001).
- ²³ Don Hellriegel, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Richard W. Woodman. <u>Organizational Behavior</u> 8th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 1998).
 - ²⁴ Porras, 87.
 - ²⁵ Ibid., 51.
 - ²⁶ Ibid., 52.
 - ²⁷ Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do, 5-16.
 - ²⁸ Porras, 26.
- ²⁹ Patricia S. Pond , Director, Communicative Arts, "Mentoring?," memorandum for students of the U. S. Army War College, Class of 2002, Carlisle, PA, on 31 July 2001. Professor Pond provided the (*Mentoring?*) essay that was used by the US AWC to prompt American student's written arguments on the topic of mentoring. The topic was used to produce samples for evaluation of the student's writing skills. Students were allowed three hours to prepare their responses to the topic.
- ³⁰ Patricia Pond, Director, Communicative Arts, "USAWC Writing Sample Directions," memorandum for students of the U.S. Army War College, Class of 2002, Carlisle, PA, on 31 July 2001. These were the written directions provided to the student body.
- ³¹ U. S. Army War College, "USAWC AY02 Statistical Data," available from < http://carlisle-www.army.mil; Internet; accessed 2 August 2001.
- ³² COL Gregg F. Martin, "Mentorship: Meaningful Leadership Concept, Confusing Cliché, or Euphemism for Favoritism?" (draft) in <u>Strategic Leadership</u> I (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001).
 - ³³ Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, 5-18

³⁴ Ibid., 7-23

³⁵ B. F. Skinner as quoted by Sharan B. Merriam and Rosemary S. Caffarella in <u>Learning in Adulthood: A Comprehensive Guide</u> 2nd Ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers 1999), 252.

³⁶ American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, 70.

³⁷ Martin, 326.

³⁸ Bell.

³⁹ M. R. Steele, *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (Washington, D.C: Department of Army, 2001), a* report submitted to the Army Chief of Staff; referenced in Thomas A. Kolditz, Scott A. Petersen, and Heidi H. Graham, "Feedback Seeking Behavior and the Development of Mentor-Protégé Relationships" (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, 2001), 6

⁴⁰ Thomas A. Kolditz, Scott A. Petersen, and Heidi H. Graham, "Feedback Seeking Behavior and the Development of Mentor-Protégé Relationships" (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, 2001), 6.

⁴¹ Steele, 6.

⁴² U. S. Department of Transportation "One Dot Mentoring Program;" available from http://mentor.dot.gov/index.html; Internet; accessed 28 October 2001.

⁴³ Leonard Wong, "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," in <u>Strategic</u> Leadership 1 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Oct 2000).

⁴⁴ COL Thomas A. Kolditz, "The Fallacy of Top-Down Mentoring," lecture, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U. S. Army War College, 16 October 2001), cited with permission of Dr. Kolditz. Dr Kolditz is Professor and Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U. S. Military Academy who has done research on mentoring.

⁴⁵.Calvin Coolidge (1872-1933), a former U.S. President that was a director of the New York Life Insurance Company when this message was distributed to agents in 1932."Persistence," available from http://www.bartleby.com/66/31/14831.html; Internet; accessed 25 February 2002.

⁴⁶ Martin, 339-340.

⁴⁷ James A. Crupi, "Adaptive Leadership," lecture (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College), 27 February 2002, cited with permission of Mr. Crupi.

⁴⁸ Porras, 49-70.

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